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CITIZEN TEACHER: DAMNED IF YOU DO, DAMNED IF
YOU DON'T
Susan P. Stuart-

The recent Supreme Court case of Garcetti V-. Ceballos is becoming
one of the most-used cases in its mere two-year history. It denies to
public employees the protection of the First Amendment when speaking
in their official duties. In reviewing the cases both leading up to and
then relying oh Garcetti, one is struck by the inherent conflict that nowpermeates some school board-employee relationships.
Whereas
preceding cases attempted to reach a balance between the school board
and its employees' speech rights, bad management practices now seem
to trump the First Amendment. Such practices have school boards
discharging teachers and administrators for speaking out truthfullyon matters of fiscal mismanagement, student discipline, and similar
school district problems. In the context of those cases, this Article posits
that being seduced by the weapon of Garcetti 's absolute power will
create unanticipated and legal consequences to both school boards and
the educational institution itself

• Associate Professor, Valparaiso University School of Law. Th~ author taught in the public
schools for six years before attending law school and represented Indiana State_Teachers Associati.on
during nine years -of private practice-. Many thanks to Ezra Hurwitz for his exemplary work as my
research assistant, and to Bill Gist, 1STA UniServ Director, and Dick Darko, ISTA General Counsel, for
their willingness to assist in this project. Thanks also to Ivan Bodensteiner for our conversations
comparing student speech with teacher speech. I was inspired by my father, Thomas Stuart; a high
school principal who spoke truth to power and lost his job but regained his purpose as a guidance
counselor, and by my mother, Mary Stuart, an elementary school teacher who always hoped for the best
from school administrations but understood-the balancing power of the union.
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INTRODUCTION

In perhaps one of the most extraordinarily ill-considered and shortsighted opinions penned by the United States Supreme Court in recent
1
years, Garcetti v. Ceballos is already having an adverse impact on
teachers and school administrators. More importantly, Garcetti has the
potential to gravely harm the way school districts discharge their
educational function because of the case's adverse impact on school
employees, especially teachers but also sc:hool administrators. If
Garcetti is wielded by school boards, the fallout may also affect the
efficient operation of the school district by impairing educators' duties
to th.eir stud.ents and to the public weal.
What exactly is the weapon that Garcetti gives to school boards that
could do so much harrn? In short, it allows school boards to retaliate
without consequence against teachers for doing their jobs properly.
Such retaliation may be as draconian as the educator's discharge. And it
may already be too late to stop the trend, given the number of school
boards relying on Garcetti to support adverse employment actions
against teachers and administrators since it was handed down in
2006.
The remedy that the Supreme Court has removed from teachers'
arsenal of protection is the long-recognized First Amendment right
whereby an individual public employee's speech may be protected from
2
the power of the state.
Where they might otherwise have a
constitutional claim under the First Amendment for an adverse job
action their employers have taken based on their speech, the Supreme
Court now says they have no such thing if their words were uttered or
3
their deeds done in the course of their employment duties. Since May
30, 2006, a school board may lawfully retaliate against teachers who
voice concerns about a school district's not serving disabled children
4
adequately, fraud and mismanagement in the operation of a federally
5
6
7
funded program, misuse of athletic funds, and student discipline.
1. 547 u.s. 410 (2006).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see, e.g., Public Employee Speech, 120 HARV. L. REV. 273 (2006);
Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing Public Employee Speech, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 1007 (2005).
3. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at423.
4. See. e.g., Houlihan v. Sussex Technical Sch. Dist., 461 F. Supp. 2d 252 (D. Del. 2006);
Yatzus v. Appoquinimink Sch. Dist., 458 F. Supp. 2d 235 (D. DeL 2006); Ryan v. Shawnee- Mission
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 512, 437 F. Supp. 2d I 233 (0. Kan. 2006), reconsideration denied, No. 05-2213,
2006 WL 2475326 (D. Kan. Aug. 25; 2006).
5. See, e.g., Casey v. W. Las Vegas Indep. Sch. Dist., 473 F.3d l32J (1Oth Cir. 2007); Battle v.
Bd. of Regents, 468 FJd 755 (lith Cir. 2006).
6. See. e.g., Williams v. Dallas lndep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689 {5th Cir. 2007).
7. See, e.g., Cavazos v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 210 F. App'x 414 (5th Cir. 2006).
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More acts and deeds will surely be punished as administrators feel
pressured by school boards to keep order in their schools. Ironically, the
administrators who mete out these disciplinary actions on behalf of their
employers are le_ft in an even more tenuous position because they are
equally affected by Garcetti, but generally they are not accorded the
"just cause" contractual or statutory protections given to teachers,
especially to those on tenure.
The cases keep rolling in as public employers take advantage of
Garcetti' s ruling to justify retaliating against employees for doing their
jobs. As of its first anniversary on May 30, 2007, 280 opinions have
cited Garcetti, generally favorably in upholding the firing of any number
of public employees including teachers. Prior to then, courts had relied
8
primarily on Connick v. Myers to determine the lawfulness of
retaliatory acts under the First Amendment. Less than one-fourth as
many cases 60 in all jurisdictions cited to Connick in Connick's first
9
year.
This trend portends danger for schools in general and for students in
particular.
The message the Supreme Court has sent to public
employees, including teachers, is they can be fired even if they are doing
their jobs correctly. Communicating is what teachers do for a living;
communicating about the conditions of their schools and the needs of
students is what teachers do as a profession. In light of the educator
cases that have relied on Garcettl, three communication contexts can
now jeopardize a teacher's job. The first type of communication for
which a school board can retaliate against a teacher is communication
classified as an official duty of the job, excluding instruction.. Of the
three types of speech involved_, retaliation for this is probably the most
grievous. Teachers can do their jobs perfectly and beautifully and still
be punished. Garcetti does not even give teachers a legitimate choice:
they can refuse to do their job that is, refuse to communicate and be
punished; the_y can do their jobs and be punished.
Second in the courts' sights are
communications
that
are
job-related
•
although not necessarily associated with enumerated, "official" duties.
Such speech might include matters related to the interior workings of the
school or other matters that do not pertain directly to a teacher's specific
classroom job. This type of speech often arises for more altruistic

,8. 461

u.s. 138 (l983).

9. In all fairness, one cause of the exploding number may be that the research database used to
count those opinions Westlaw . seems to have stored more unpublished opinions than in the years
immediately succeeding Connick. But that circumstance cannot account for what appears to be an
explosion in questionable management decisions in the recent years. By its second anniversy, the
number of cases citing to Garcetti had more than doubled.
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reasons than by compulsion of the job itself. For example, teachers who
care enough about their profession and their students believe they should
speak up about those matters as the right, the ethical, and the
professional thing to do. However, the Court now says that teachers, as
public employees, do not have the same protections as ordinary citizens
when it comes to speech and acts otherwise protected by the First
Amendment. Garcetti now forces teachers to choose between their
professionalism .and their livelihood. If teachers can be· fired for caring
about their jobs and their students, why should teachers continue to
care?
Third is the type of speech that the Garcetti majority skirted:
academic freedom. Although the Court assured the dissenting justices
that the decision had no impact on educators' academic freedom in the
classroom, a contrary trend may be emerging in some courts, That trend
assures that school boards have complete control over speech in the
classroom because of their supposed control over the content of the
curriculum. Teachers may not be saying anything wrong or even outside
the content of the curriculum, but the courts_ are interfering in
discretionary teaching decisions and exerting an unwarranted
paternalistic control over that skill for which teachers teach and that
creativity to adapt their instruction to the needs of the classroom and the
subject matter.
Several negative consequ-etJ.ces necessarily arise from these decisions.
One of those consequences is the attack on teacher morale and
professionalism. A necessary adjunct of that consequence is that
students no longer have the benefit of the best that teachers have to offer
as civic role models: teachers will instead guard their job security by
hewing to a "party" line rather than by offering the panoply of choices
that only a democracy can offer. A second major consequence is the
loss of the nature of the civic institution itself. Confining teachers to
their oars rather than allowing them to rock the boat is anathema to the
duty, responsibility, and nature of public schools. A third consequence
is that teachers will start to air the school district's dirty laundry in
public. .Now that a school board can retaliate for on-the-job speech,.
teachers will resort to speaking out at public school board meetings or to
the media to achieve the corrections they know must be implemented.
Last, but not least, school boards and administrators will lose the
inherent ability to hold teachers accountable for their work, especially in
the classroom.. Perhaps even worse, the door may be opened for
asserting educational malpractice claims. If teachers do not have the
discretion to do other than follow the direction of the school boards, then
school boards and school administrators not having delegated any real
.

.

.

.
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teaching function will be wholly responsible for the results, not the
teachers themselves.
The overarching thesis, then, is that no good can come from school
districts' using Garcetti to protect them from legitimate First
Amendment claims by teachers. As the case analyses demonstrate, the
vast majority of these cases arose from bad management, not from bad
teaching. Ironically, justice serves those who do wrong rather than those
who do right. In Part I, this Article briefly outlines the pre-Garcetti First
Amendment protections for public employees and recounts, briefly,
some of the ways teachers' First Amendment rights had been protected
before May 30, 2006. Part I then explains the opinion in Garcetti itself.
Part II analyzes the Garcetti progeny, including cases for both teachers
and administrators. Part III addresses the official duties of teachers for
which they might be punished under the First Amendment. Last, Part IV
provides an analysis of the harms that will come to students, school
boards, and the educational institution itself from school boards' relying
on Garcetti to retaliate against teachers for doing their jobs.
l.

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS CRASH AND BURN

Although a background survey of this issue might seem a bit
unnecessary, rather than getting straight to the point in Garcetti, it is
necessary when dealing with the First Amendment rights of teachers.
This context is important in understanding the unique citizenship role of
teachers, who are, as the background demonstrates, not just employees.
Indeed, one might posit from reading the effusive protections for
teachers in these survey cases that teachers should enjoy different First
Amendment rights than other public employees. Regardless, teachers
have played a critical role in the development of public employee First
Amendment jurisprudence.
And this historical background
demonstrates how far the Court has strayed from a rational balance of
the employer-employee relationship to a one-sided analysis of the
interests of the employer over the good of the goverrunent institution.
As is their wont and perhaps their plight, teachers have been at the
forefront of the First Amendment cases, pitting their right to speak
against their employers' ability to fire them for that right. Indeed,
teachers have been at the center of most of the First Amendment
controversies that have arisen out of public employees' speech that have
reached the Court for at least two reasons. First, teachers' stock in trade
is speaking. It is also their stock in trade to teach, through instruction
and example, young Americans to be good citizens, and a responsibility
of citizenship is exercising one's freedom of speech. Second, teachers
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view themselves as independent actors: they must make the day-to-day
decisions to deliver the educational product in this important
governmental enterprise. They neither welcome nor accept the contrary
view that they are at the bottom of the educational bureaucracy, below
school administrators and school boards in the hierarchy, particularly
because they have as much professional education training as school
administrators and more so than the vast majority of school board
members. As a consequence, the relationship between the leading and
the led is uneasy at best and volatile at worst. These tensions therefore
make teachers particularly vulnerable to retaliation by their public
employers school administrators and, through administrators, school
boards.
A.

The Launch

Marvin Pickering was just such a teacher. He wrote a letter to the
10
editor of his local paper.
It resulted from several years' worth of
financial matters surrounding the building of two new schools in the
11
district, and in contrast to a series of letters ostensibly from the local
teachers' union and favorable to the tax increase, Pickering's letter was
critical of the school board and school superintendent, and of the tax
12
increase, which later failed.
In particular, he targeted the school
13
district's allocation of educational and athletic funding. Pickering also
wrote that the superintendent had threatened teachers with adverse
14
consequences if they opposed the referendum and that the letters
ostensibly from the local teachers' unions had been vetted by the
superintendent in accordance with school board policy requiring that
anything submitted to local newspapers must first be checked by the
building principal then submitted in triplicate to the school district's
15
publicity coordinator.
However, Pickering's letter also contained
carelessly researched and false claims that the school district had placed

10. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968).
11. First were two votes on bond issues to build the schools, the second of which passed. /d. at
565-66~ Then three years later, the ·school board proposed two tax increases for increasing educational
funding revenue. /d. at 566. Both were defeated. /d. The second of these tax increase proposals
engendered a flurry of articles and letters in the local paper. /d.
12. /d. at 566.
13. /d.
14. ld. at 576, 580-81 (appendix to opinion of the court). Pickering accurately reported the
superintendent's statement; the meaning of that statement, however, was never clear. /d. at 580-81
(appendix to opinion of the court).
15. Jd. at 576-77, 581 (appendix to opinion of the court).
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athletic expenditures as a higher priority than educational funding. He
closed with this statement: "I must sign this letter as a citizen, taxpayer
and voter, not as a teacher, since that freedom has been taken from the
teachers by the administration. Do you really know what goes on
17
behind those stone walls at the high school?" After his letter was
18
published, Pickering was fired, and he made history in Pickering v.
Board ofEducation.
Pickering attacked the application of Illinois's teacher dismissal
19
statute as unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
The Illinois
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the school board; the U.S. Supreme
Court reversed and stated,
To the extent that the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion may be read to
suggest that teachers may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the
First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to
comment on matters of public interest in connection with the operation of
the public schools in which they work, it proceeds on a premise that has
20
been unequivocally rejected in numerous prior decisions of this Court.

The Court acknowledged, however, that a school district as an
employer has different interests in regulating teacher speech than the
govertunent generally might have in regulating speech of the general
21
citizenry.
This acknowledgment established the now-classic balance
between the "interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon
matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
22
employees. ''
In addressing this balance in Pickering's case, the Court first
concluded that "the question whether a school system requires additional
funds is a matter of legitimate public concern on which the judgment of
the school administration, including the School Board, cannot, in a
society that leaves such questions to popular vote, be taken as
23
conclusive.''
The Court particularly noted that teachers of all
citizens have definite and informed opinions about school funding and
how those funds should be allocated because of their background and

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

/d. at 577-78, 581 - 82 (appendix to opinion of the court).

ld. at 578.
Id. at 566.
/d. at 565.
/d. at 568.
/d.
/d.
/d. at 571.
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24

expertise. To prevent them from speaking out would be a disservice to
the public in general; indeed, they should be encouraged to speak out
.
25
freely.
As to the other part of the balancing test, the Court noted that
Pickering's criticisms were not directed against anyone with whom he
26
worked directly.
Instead, his criticisms were directed against the
superintendent and school board with whom Pickering had no daily
27
contact.
There was neither a disciplinary issue with an immediate
28
superior nor harm to the working relationship of co-workers. Despite
the school board's argument that Pickering had violated his "duty of
29
loyalty," the Court determined that his employee relationship with the
superintendent and school board was rather attenuated and "not the kind
of close working. relationships for which it can persuasively be claimed
that personal loyalty and confidence are necessary to their proper
30
functioning."
Thus, the Court allowed that criticisms of "nominal
31
superio{s" may not be the basis for retaliation.
As a consequence,
Pickering, while contributing to the debate on school board matters,
stood in the same shoes as the general public: the state could afford the
school board no greater right to punish Pickering than it ·could punish a
32
member of the general public.
In essence, the Court determined that "a teacher's exercise of his right
to speak on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for his
33
dismissal from public employment". even if the speech is wrong~
Instead, the Court said,
What we . . . have before us is a case in which a teacher has made
erroneous public statements upon issues then currently the subject of
public attention, which are critical of his ultimate employer but which are
neither shown nor can be presumed to have in any way either impeded the
teacher's proper performance of his daily duties in the classroom or to
24.
25.
26.
27.

/d.
/d.
ld.
Id.
28. /d.
29. !d.
30. !d.

at 572.

at 569-70.
at 569.
at 570.
at 568.
at 570.
31. /d. at 574.
32. ld. at 57~. Furthennore, because most of the readers of Pickering's letter greeted it with
"massive apathy and total disbelief," the statements were not per se ha1 rnful to the operations of the
school district sufficient for the school board to prove the statutory grounds for Pickering's dismissal.
/d. at 570-71. Equating its own interests with that of the school district it governed went beyond the
purview of the school board's interest in controlling teacher speech criticism of the school board was
not criticism of the school district. /d. at 571.
33. /d. at 574.

•
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have interfered with the regular operation of the schools generally. In
these circumstances we conclude that the interest of the school
administration in limiting teachers' opportunities to contribute to public
debate is not significantly greater than its interest in limiting a similar
34
contribution by any member of the general public.

Thus did the Pickering case ·enter the pantheon of First Amendment
jurisprudence.

B.

The Trajectory

The Court reaffirmed the Pickering principle in dictum in Perry v.
35
Sindermann, a higher education case. Robert Sindermann was a rather
36
incendiary young professor in the Texas state college system. During
the fourth of a series of one-year contracts at Odessa Junior College,
Sindermann was elected president of the Texas Junior College Teachers
37
Association. During the course of those duties, he became embroiled
in several disputes with the state Board of Regents and some of its
policies, specifically criticizing the Board's opposition to making
38
Odessa Junior College into a four-year institution.
Sindennann's
contract was not renewed for a fifth year, ostensibly for
39
The thrust of the Court's decision and the
insubordination.
"teachable" moment arising from the case surrounded Sindermann's due
process rights. And those due process rights arose from his claim that
the Board of Regents improperly retaliated for Sindermann's
40
Relying on Pickering,
constitutionally protected freedom of speech.
the Court reminded the Board of Regents that "a teacher's public
criticism of his superiors on matters of public concern may be
constitutionally protected and may, therefore, be an impem1issible basis
41
for termination of his employment."
Not too long after Perry v. Sindermann came City of Madison, Joint
42
School District No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission.
Although not addressing an employer retaliation claim, the Court was
very deferential to teachers' First Amendment rights because of their
employment, and not just their status as citizens. In this case, a local
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

/d. at 572-73 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
408 u.s. 593 (1972).
/d. at 594.
/d.
/d. at 594-95.
/d. at 595.
/d.
/d. at 598 (citing Pickering v. Bd. ofEduc., 391 U.S. 563,568 (1968)).
429 U.S. 167 (1976).

•
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teachers union- Madison Teachers, Inc. filed a complaint before the
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission. The complaint asserted
that the Madison school board had committed a prohibited labor practice
when it allowed a nonunion teacher to speak at a public school board
43
meeting on a matter related to ongoing collective bargaining.
After
deterrnining that the teacher had not engaged in "negotiations'' through
his presentation, the Supreme Court held that a school board could not
exclude teacher speech and thereby allow the union to monopolize the
public debate:, ''He addressed the school board not merely as one of its
employees but also as a concerned citizen, seeking to express his views
44
on an important decision of his government. '' In once again affirming
the contribution teachers make to public discourse, the Court asserted,
"Where the State has opened a forum for direct citizen involvement, it is
difficult to find justification for excluding teachers who make up the
overwhelming proportion of school employees and who are most vitally
45
concerned with the proceedings." The Court explained, ~'Teachers not
only constitute the overwhelming bulk of employees of the school
system, but they are the very core of that system; restraining teachers'
expressions to the board on matters involving the operation of the
schools would seriously impair the board's ability to govern the
46
district." Clearly, teachers could not be excluded from speaking out at
public school board meetings on matters considered to be public
concerns.
Then in 1977, along came Fred Doyle, a teacher who did not get
tenure in part because of a telephone call to a local radio station about a
47
memorandum circulated by his principal. Doyle was in his fifth year
of employment with the school district three one-year contracts and
one two-year contract and was eligible for tenure at the school
48
district. During the first year of his two-year contract, Doyle served as
president of his local teachers' association, and he served on the
association's executive board the second year, a two-year period during
49
which there was friction between the school board and the association.
Doyle also had a tendency to draw other unwanted attention to himself
with poor anger management skills that led to dustups with a fellow

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

/d. at 170-71.
/d. at 174-75.
Id. at 175.
/d. at 177.
Mt Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
/d. at 281.
/d.
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50

teacher, non-certified staff, and students. The last straw came during
his last semester of teaching.
During that semester, Doyle's principal circulated a memo suggesting
that public support for school bond issues was directly related to teacher
51
Doyle telephoned a local disc jockey and
dress and appearance.
52
conveyed the substance of the memorandum. The radio station ran the
53
Doyle
adoption of a new dress code for teachers as a news item.
apologized to his principal for the incident, conceding that he should
have first addressed his concern to the principal rather than going first to
54
A month later, when the superintendent made his annual
the media.
recommendations to the school board for rehiring the next year, Doyle
55
was among ten teachers he recommended not be rehired.
Per the usual due process, Doyle requested the reasons for the non6
renewal of his contract. 5 The superintendent responded that Doyle had
"a notable lack of tact in handling professional matters" that left "much
57
doubt" as to his "sincerity in establishing good school relationships."
In illustration of that professional failing, the superintendent cited a
disciplinary incident with an obscene gesture and the telephone call to
58
The school board adopted the superintendent's
the radio station.
59
60
recomn1endations. Doyle sued.
Because Doyle was a non-tenured teacher at the time of his dismissal,
he could have been non-renewed for no reason whatsoever but not in
retaliation for his constitutionally protected right of speech under the
61
First Amendment. In reliance on its earlier reasoning in Pickering, the
Supreme Court examined the balancing of the teacher's right as a citizen
to cornment on matters of public concern in tension with the school
board's duty, as employer, to promote the efficiency of its educational

50. Doyle argued with another teacher who then slapped him. /d. The administration suspended
both teachers for a day, but the association engaged in a walkout, resulting in the administration lifting
the suspensions. /d. Doyle also argued with cafeteria employees about the amount of spaghetti they
served him, referred to students as "sons of bitches" during a disciplinary incident, and gestured
obscenely at a couple of girls who disobeyed him during his cafeteria duty. /d. at 281-82.
51. !d. at 282.
52. /d.
53. /d.
54. /d.
55. /d.
56. /d.
57. /d.

58. ld. at 282-83.
59. /d. at 282.
60. See id. at 283.
61. !d. at 283-84.
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62

services.
The Court detem1ined that Doyle had violated no school
board policy when he passed along the substance of the memo and that
the school board conceded that its retaliatory response was nothing other
63
than a reaction to the memo's public disclosure~
Thus, the Court
accepted the district court's determination that the First Amendment
64
protected Doyle's speech.
The point of departure between the district court and the Supreme
Court was the weight to be given the school board's decision in light of
the importance of retaining teachers. Indeed, Justice Rehnquistwriting for the Court emphasized that, but for the school board's
65
action, Doyle would have been granted tenure~ When such important
decisions are made, he opined, the school board should be given the
opportunity to justify its decision on lawful grounds; stated differently,
he said the_school board should be given the opportunity to show that it
would have reached the same decision even without the First
66
Amendment-related behavior.
The Court justified this shifting of
burdens to prevent a teacher from taking advantage of a perhaps minor
First Amendment issue to retain the same employment status, especially
67
where, as in this case, a permanency of employment was at stake.
Thus, after a plaintiff-teacher carries his burden of proving that his
conduct was protected by the First Amendment and that his conduct was
a motivating factor in an adverse employment decision, the defendant
school board must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it
would have reached the same employment decision in the absence of the
68
protected conduct in order to prevail.
After deciding that teacher
expression, like public statements, was protected by the First
69
Amendment, the Court next turned to teacher speech on the job.
In Givhan v~ Western Line Consolidated School District, the nonrenewal of Bessie Givhan's contract as a junior high English teacher was
prompted by her complaints and criticisms of school district
employment policies and practices that she perceived to be racially

62., 1d. at 284.
63. !d.
·64. /d.
65. /d. at 286.
66. /d. at 287. Rehnquist's statements are unclear on whether the fact that Doyle was on the cusp
of tenure was significant, but it seemed to be.
67. ld. at 285.
68. /d. at 287. Ultimately, the school board was able to do just that, justified by the Sixth Circuit
as Doyle's failing of having a "quick temper." Doyle v. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 670
F.2d59, 61 (6th Cir. 1982).
69. 439

u.s. 410 (1979).
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70

The sticking point in. what would ordinarily be an
discriminatory.
open-and-shut First Amendment retaliation case was that Givhan had
made her complaints privately to her principal, behind closed doors, and
those sessions were perceived by the principal as "petty and
71
unreasonable," "insulting," "loud," "arrogant,'' and "hostile."
Th.e
Fifth Circuit decision had favored the school district, in part because of
the alleged effect the exchanges had on the working relationship
72
between Givhan and her employer.
The Supreme Court, however,
pointed out that the principal was not an unwilling participant in the
73
exchanges, having invited Givhan into his office for these discussions.
Consequently, Givhan's private expressions were constitutionally
74
protected.
So up to Givhan, teachers primarily, although not exclusively, had
taken the lead in forging legal protections for public employees who
engaged in First Amendment speech. An attorney case would throw a
monkey-wrench in the works.

C.

In-Flight Adjustments
75

In 1983, Connick v. Myers confused matters. Connick involved the
firing of an Assistant District Attorney in the District Attorney's Office
76
in New Orleans. Sheila Myers tried criminal cases as an Assistant in
the New Orleans District Attorney's Office for five and a half years
77
when she was transferred to a different section of the criminal court.
She was unhappy about the transfer and made her views plain to several
supervisors in the office, including Connick, the then-District
78
Attorney.
As a part of these discussions, Myers expressed her
79
concerns about other office matters.
During one such conversation,
70. /d. at412-13.
71. !d.
72. !d. at 414-15.
73. ld. at 415.
74. The case was ultimate-ly remanded for consideration under the Mt. Healthy v. Doyle principle
to detennine whether the school board's non-renewal action was primarily motivated by Givhan's
protected expression. /d. at 417.
75. 461 u.s. 138 (1983).
76. Although assistant district atto·m eys served at the pleasure of the District Attorney, id. at 140,
even attorneys serving at the Will of their employer cannot be punished for exercising their
constitutionally protected rights, id. at 142.
77. ld. at 140.
78. !d.
79. /d. at 141. When one of her supervisors disagreed that her concerns were shared by Qthers in
the office, Myers told him she would do research on the matter. /d. Later that night and during the next
morning, Myers compiled a questionnaire about office morale, the office transfer policy, confidence in
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80

Connick continued to urge her to accept the transfer.
Myers told
81
Connick she would consider it, and Connick left the office.
Myers
then distributed a questionnaire she had compiled on other office matters
82
to fifteen other assistant district attorneys.
When one of the
supervisors notified Connick that Myers was instigating a "miniinsurrection," Connick returned to the office and fired her for refusing to
accept the transfer and for insubordination in her distribution of the
83
questionnaire. This questionnaire would become the cause celebre in
this case: was Myers exercising her First Amendment rights in the
distribution of this questionnaire because it represented a matter of
84
public concem?
'
Justice White, in his majority opinion, started as the Pickering Court
did, decrying the republic's early dogma that public employees owed a
85
duty of loyalty to their employer. This dogma came to a head in the
1950s and 1960s, in the wake of the "Red Scare," as states attempted to
force public employees to sign loyalty oaths or otherwise face
86
dismissal.
By then, the Court's jurisprudence protected the rights of
public employees to participate in public affairs without fear of
discharge or similar punishment: "The First Amendment 'was fashioned
to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
87
political and social changes desired by the people. '"
However,
supervisors, and similar concerns for distribution to other staff members, including "whether employees
felt pressured to work in political campaigns." /d. Question 11 asked, "Do you ever feel pressured to
work in political campaigns on behalf of office supported candidates?" /d. at 155 (appendix to opinion
of the court).

80. /d. at 141.
81. /d.
82. ld.
83. /d.
84. See id. at 141-42.
85. /d. at 143-44. As famously stated by Justice Holmes, "'[a] policeman may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.'" /d. (quoting
McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N ..E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892)). Holmes evidently envisioned the
employment decision as being rather one-sided in favor of the employer:
There are few employments for hire in which the servant does not agree to suspend his
constitutional rights of free speech as well as of idleness by the implied tenns of his
contract. The servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the tenns which
are .offered. him. On .the. .same..principle. the city .may .impose..any .reasonable .condition
upon holding offices within its control. This condition seems to us reasonable, if that be
a question open to revision here.
McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N .E. 517, 517-18 (Mass. 1892). Ironically, Holmes was also
an early proponent of the right of workers to organize into private associations. See, e.g., Plant v.
Woods, 57 N.E. 1011, 1016 (Mass. 1900) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077,
1081-82 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
86. Connick, 461 U.S. at 144; see, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).

87. Connick, 461 U.S . at 145 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,484 (1957)).
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My,e rs's speech hit a snag: it did not appear to fall under this general
rubric of "public concern. ,s-s
Justice White's paradigm for protected speech included examining
whether her speech was related to any political, social, or community
89
concern worthy of protection. If not, then a govermnent employer had
greater latitude in dismissing a government employee without the
90
"intrusive oversight" of the courts:
We hold ... that when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon
matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only
of personal interest, absent th.e most unusual circumstances, a federal
court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a
personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the
91
employee's behavior.

White then outlined a process for detertnining when speech is a matter
92
of public concern, a question of law for the court
That process for
reviewing the facts in the record required an inquiry as to the speech's
93
content, form and context. The record as a whole in the instant case
indicated that most of the matters contained in Myers's questionnaire
were not matters of public concern because they dealt with matters of
94
internal office affairs.
One matter, however, touched on a public
concern: whether the assistant district attorneys felt pressure to work on
95
political campaigns.
The next step of the inquiry was the balance of the government's
96
In making that assessment also a
interest dismissing the employee.
97
Justice White quoted Justice Powell
question of law for the Court
from an earlier case:
To this end, the Government, as an employer, must have-wide discretion
and control over the management of its personnel and internal affairs.
This includes the prerogative to remove employees whose conduct
hinders efficient operation and to do so with dispatch. Prolonged
retention of a disruptive or otherwise unsatisfactory employee can
88. Id. at 148.
89. Id. at 146.
90. /d. Speech on private matters might also be protected under circumstances not present in this
case. /d. at 147.
91. /d. at 147 (citing Bishop v. Wood~ 426 U.S. 341,349-50 (1976)).
92. ld. at 147-48 & n.7.
93. /d. at 148 .
94. ld: at 148-49.
95. /d. at t 49. The problem hinted at coercion of public employees' beliefs for fear of
retaliation. /d.
96. /d.
97. ld. at 150 n.IO.
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adversely affect discipline and morale in the work place, foster
dishartnony, and ultimately impair the efficiency of any office or
98
agency.

In examining this management prerogative, the Court acknowledged that
there was little evidence that Myers's questionnaire occasioned any
99
disruption to the workplace. In addition, its distribution did not disturb
100
However, the Court latched
Myers's ability to function in her job.
onto her supervisors' judgment that the questionnaire's distribution was
"an act of insubordination which interfered with working
101
relationships."
Ultimately, the questions themselves had the potential
to sour what should otherwise be a close working relationship between
102
and among attorneys and their supervisors.
Thus, reduced to its essence, Myers's expression was merely "an
employee grievance concerning internal office policy" for which she
103
could be dismissed because of its disruptive potential.
Thus, a thinskinned employer was granted greater credence than his employee's
First Amendment rights in a matter of public concern.
The case that put some- employee perspective into the analysis after
104
Connick's employer perspective is Rankin v. McPherson.
Ardith
McPherson was a nineteen-year-old deputy constable assigned to
clerical work in the office of Constable Rankin of Harris County, Texas,
105
on March 30, 1981.
On that day, John Hinckley, Jr~ attempted to
106
assassinate then-President Ronald Reagan.
After hearing the news on
an office radio, McPherson discussed the news with a co-worker who
was also apparently her boyfriend in the context of the President's
efforts to cut back welfare payments, Medicaid benefits, and the food107
stamp program.
At the tail end of the conversation, McPherson said
something to the following effect: "I said, shoot, if they go for him
98. /d. at 151 (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the result in part)).
99. /d. at 152.
100. /d.at153.
101. Id. at lSL Myers's supervisors' notion of what constituted "insubordination" seems to have
little conne_ction to its meaning: '~disobedience to constituted authority. Refusal to obey some orde_r
which a superior officer is entitled to give and have obeyed. Tenn imports a willful or intentional
distegard of the lawful and reasonable instructions of the employer.'' BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 55051 (abr. 6th ed. 1991). The record before the Court provided no facts that would indicate Myers's
questiQnnaire was insubordinate in that she refused no order.
102. Connick, 461 U.S. at 152.
I03. !d. at 154.
104~ 483 u.s. 378 (1987).
I 05. !d. at 38Q-81.
106. /d. at 381.
107. /d.
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108

again, I hope they get him."
Another co-worker overheard
109
McPherson's remark and told Constable Rankin.
Rankin sutnmoned
McPherson to his office whereupon McPherson admitted the statement,
11
but qualified it by saying, "I didn't mean anything by it." ° Constable
111
Rankin fired McPherson on the spot.
Ultimately ruling in favor of McPherson's exercise of free speech, the
Court again relied on Pickering, weighing "the interests of the
[employee], as a citizen, in connnenting upon matters of public concern
and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency
112
of the public services it performs through its employees."
Justice
Marshall, writing for the Court, cautioned that the power of the state to
fire employees is a potent method for stifling free speech: "Vigilance is
necessary to ensure that public employers do not use authority over
employees to silence discourse, not because it hampers public functions
but simply because superiors disagree with the content of employees'
113
speech."
Stated differently, under the First Amendment, employers
may not fire emloyees merely to silence contrary points of view.
In addressing the threshold question of whether McPherson's
statement was a matter of public concern, the Court applied Connick's
114
content, form, and manner analysis to the record.
That analysis
revealed that McPherson's statement was a matter of public concern,
imbedded as it was in the underlying conversation about the President's
115
policies and in the radio bulletin about the assassination attempt.
Although the comments were ill-advised and controversial, the character
of the statement insofar as it did not amount to an unlawful death
threat was well within the scope of acceptable debate in this country,
where "[d]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open, and ... may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
116
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."
Completing the Pickering analysis was the Court's examination of the
state's interest in McPherson's expression and whether her speech
interfered with the efficient provision of public services. The Court
108. /d.
109. /d.
II 0. /d.
Ill. /d.
112. /d.
(1968)).
113. ld.
114. /d.
115. /d.
116. /d.
270 ( 1964)).

at 382.
at 384 (alteration in original) (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 39I U.S. 563, 568

at 384-85.

at 386-87.
at 387 (second alteration in original) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
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reviewed the statement's manner, time, place, and context whether her
speech had a detrimental impact on any close working relationships
dependent upon personal loyalty and confidence; whether it impeded her
own duties; or whether it interfered with the regular operation of the
117
office.
First, the record was devoid of evidence that McPherson's
118
statement interfered with the workplace functions.
Indeed, Rankin
testified that he had not even considered workplace functions in his
119
dismissal decision.
In addition, McPherson's statement was made in a
120
private conversation to which the public had no access.
But for a coworker's overhearing the comment, it had no impact on the efficient
121
functioning of the office.
Rankin had merely decided that McPherson was unfit to work in his
122
office because he disliked the content of her remark.
Such a bad
management decision was insufficient state interest to support
McPherson's discharge:

•

We cannot believe that every employee in Constable Rankin's office,
whether computer operator, electrician, or file clerk, is equally required,
on pain of discharge, to avoid any statement susceptible of being
interpreted by the Constable as an indication that the employee may be
unworthy of employment in his law enforcement agency. At some point,
such concerns are so removed from the effective functioning of the public
employer that they cannot prevail over the free speech rights of the public
123
employee.

As Justice Powell asserted in his concurring opinion, "The risk that a
single, offhand comment directed to only one other worker will lower
morale, disrupt the work force, or otherwise undermine the mission of
124
the office borders on the fanciful."
So the Court seemed to have reached a practical balance to free
speech, recognizing that bad management practices should not govern
whether public employees could feel free to speak. Rather, a mature
inquiry into whether the speech actually affected the efficient
functioning of the government office would dictate whether a
government employee was being appropriately disciplined or
inappropriately retaliated against. Garcetti changed that balance.

117. /d.
118. /d. at389.
119. /d.
120. /d.

121. /d.
122. /d. at 390.
123. /d. at 391 (footnote omitted).
124. /d. at 393 (Powell, J., concurring).
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Losing the Tiles on Reentry

In May 2006, the Court took the unprecedented step of allowing
public employers to retaliate against public employees for speech~related
activities, even if the speech was on a matter of ~ublic concern, if those
1 5
activities arose during the course of their jobs.
Garcetti involved a
dispute in the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office where
26
Richard Ceballos was a deputy district attorney:
Ceballos was a
127
calendar deputy in the office's Pomona branch.
In February, 2000, a
defense attorney advised Ceballos that an affidavit supporting a search
warrant in a pending case was filled with inaccuracies and that he
128
intended to challenge the warrant.
Because calendar deputies
sometimes reviewed pending_cases, Ceballos examined the affidavit in
question and determined that it was replete with serious
29
misrepresentations_l He followed up with the affiant, a deputy sheriff
for the Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department, but was unsatisfied
130
with the explanation for the inaccuracies in the document.
So
Ceballos informed his supervisors of the issue then wrote a disposition
131
memorandum of the problem.
A meeting was then convened to
132
discuss the affidavit.
In attendance were Ceballos, his supervisors,
133
and members of the sheriffs department.
The meeting became
134
heated.
When the district attorney proceeded to prosecute the case
despite the poor quality of the affidavit, the defense called Ceballos to
135
testify about his concems.
The trial court ultimately denied the
136
defense's challenge to the warrant.
Afterward, Ceballos was
subjected to several retaliatory employment actions, including
137
reassignment, transfer, and the denial of a promotion.
Ceballos sued,
asserting that his public employer had violated the First and Fourteenth
138
Amendments.
As usual, Justice Kennedy relied on the two-step Pickering balancing
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
13 5.
136.
137.
138.

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
/d. at 413.
/d.
/d. at 413-14.
!d. at 414.
/d.
/d.
/d.

/d.
/d.
I d. at 4 14-15.
/d. at 415.

/d.
/d.
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analysis to set the threshold question in determining "whether [Ceballos]
139
spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concem.''
Ifthat threshold is
crossed, then "[t]he question becomes whether the relevant government
entity had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently
140
from any other member of the general public.''
Justice Kennedy then divided the Pickering threshold analysis into an
additional two-part inquiry: ''We hold that when public employees make
statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution
141
If
does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.''
the employee cannot traverse that step, then there is no further inquiry
142
and the speech is not protected.
In analyzing the facts in the record,
the Court concluded that Ceballos composed his memorandum while
acting within his professional duties: investigating charges, supervising
143
attorneys, and preparing filings.
His memo was about the disposition
of a pending case and therefore was within his official duties as a
144
g,overnment employee.
The Court did not "articulate a comprehensive framework for
defining the scope of an employee;s duties in cases where there is room
for serious debate." The Court rejected, "however, the suggestion that
employers can restrict employees' rights by creating excessively broad
145
job descriptions.''
What those official duties might be under any
particular circumstance may be open for debate, but what had previously
been a question of law in the first prong of the Pickering analysis
became a question of fact:
The proper inquiry is a practical one. Formal job descriptions often bear
little resemblance to the duties an employee actually is expected to
perform, and the listing of a given task in an employee's written job
description is neither necessary nor sufficient to demonstrate that
co~ducting .the task is within the scoEe of the employee's professional
16
duttes for Ftrst Amendment purposes.

The Court's analysis of Ceballos's job situation and his speech
provides some context. He could not be punished just for speaking in

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

/d. at 418 (citing Pickering v. Bd. ofEduc., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968))~
/d. (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568).
/d. at 421 (emphasis added).
Seeid.
/d. at 422.
/d.
!d. at 424 (citing id. at 431 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting)).
!d. at 424--25.
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147

private rather than in public.
Nor could he be punished because the
148
subject matter of his speech was within his employment.
"The
controlling factor in Ceballos'[s] case is that his expressions were made
pursuant to his duties as a calendar deputy. . .. Ceballos spoke as a
prosecutor fulfilling a responsibility to advise his supervisor about how
149
best to proceed with a pending case . . . ."
Thus, the employer's
ability to retaliate against an employee for such speech "simply reflects
the exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has
150
commissioned or created."
So in traversing the current First Amendment tenet, the courts have
several steps to follow, most of which are dominated not by the speech
or the employee's rights but by the employer's control of the workplace.
First, a court will examine the facts for the Garcetti analysis: Did the
employee speak pursuant to official duties? If not, then the court
follows the Pickering-Connick analysis: Did the employee speak on a
matter of public concern? If the employee spoke on a matter of public
concern, then did the speech outweigh the employer's interest in the
efficient service of the governmental institution? If so, then the court
applies the Mt. Healthy analysis: Would the public employer have
punished the employee anyway? Somewhere in the evolution of this
test, the matter of public concern has become submerged in the
employer's three bites at the apple. In the balance between the public
employer's management rights and the public employee's speech rights,
the Court greatly tipped the scales for employers.
II. "WHEN THE (SCHOOL BOARD] DOES IT, THAT MEANS THAT IT Is NOT
151
ILLEGAL"

The Garcetti Court's initial analysis on the official duties of a public
employee in the First Amendment context has tested the abilities of
courts to determine the exact nature of one's "official'; duties in any
particular case, especially for school employees. In the near-universal
absence of written job descriptions, the courts have a tendency to rely on
the school employer's characterization of the employee's duties. Such
analysis has garnered three broad categories of speech arising from
14 7. /d. at 420-21.
148. /d. at 421.
149. /d.
150. /d. at 422 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833
(1995)).
151. A paraphrase of Richard M. Nixon •s interpretation of Executive power during a 1977
interview with David Frost: "When the President does it, that means that it is not illegal." James M.
Naughton, Asserts U.S. Role Was Prolonged by Doves, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1977, at AI.
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''official'·' duties: speech the teacher ·m ust do to accomplish the job;
speech that is job-related; and classroom speech, or academic
152
freedom.

A.

Official-Duty Speech

As discussed above, courts' inquiries as to the official duties of a
sc·hool employee is supposed to be a practical one. And although the
Court eschewed the necessity of fortnal job descriptions to determine a
public employee's official duties, it also opened the door for school
districts to provide a broad description of a school employee's duties. In
addition, some school employees acknowledged certain tasks were
within their job duties because they were proud of the care with which
they did their job and because teachers had not yet been stung by
Garcetti and the new rules of the game.
The following cases revolve around school employers' retaliation for
teacher speech that either fit within traditional official -duties or arose out
of tasks assigned by the employers. The collection primarily consists of
teachers without tenure relying on contract renewal for continuing
employment and school administrators. The status of these people, of
course, makes them bigger targets for school boards because of the lack
153
of contractual and statutory protections.
152. There may have been other legitimate grounds for the· dismissal or other punishment or
discipline administered in these cases. However, this survey is limited to those matters related to First
Amendment claims and Garcetti defenses.
153. Most of the teachers and administrators against whom school boards retaliated did not have
sufficient tenure rights to protect them. Many teachers are protected from these actions in states where
"just cause" is a stat\}tory precondition for discharging or otherwise punishing teachers. In other states,
teachers may be protected by collective bargaining agreements with Hjust cause" provisions for
discharge and discipline. Unfortunately, not -all teachers are covered by either state· tenure or collective
bargaining acts to protect their rights. Those are the most vulnerable to school board retaliation.
School administrators are even more \!ulnerable. Indeed, it is the rare occasion that a school
administrator enjoys any of those protections; they generally are not considered to have any continuing
contract rights in employment and are not members of any bargaining units that will otherwise protect
their ·rights. To make matters worse, they do not have a powerful advocacy group that can take on the
National School Boards Association like the teacher advocacy groups, National Education Association
and American Federation of Teachers. Unfortunately, many school administrators align themselves with
school board policy, often espoused by the school board's attorney. But, when push comes to shove, the
attorneys employed by a school board will heave the school administrator under the bus when things go
wrong. And school administrator advocacy groups typically offer no more than $10,000 worth of legal
assistance for job protection attorney fees, apart from professional liability insurance. See American
Association of School Administrators, Member Benefits and Services~ http://www.aasa.org/member/
content.cfm?ItemNumber=2161 &snltemNumber-5763 (last visited June 6, 2007); National Association
of Elementary School Principals, Member Services & Benefits, http://www.naesp.org/
ContentLoad.do?contentld=377 (last, visited Mar. 8, 2007); National Association of Secondary School
Program)
http://www .principals.org/s_nassp/
Principals,
Legal
Fee
Re.imbursement
sec.asp?CID= I 038&DID=54174 (last visited Mar. 8, 2007). Unfortunately, that is a mere drop in the
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Not atypical of the bunch is Gilder-Lucas v. Elmore County Board of
154
Education.
Angela Gilder-Lucas was a non-tenured high school
science teacher whose extracurricular duties included acting as sponsor
155
of the junior varsity cheerleading squad.
After a couple of parents
complained about the fairness of try-outs for the squad, Gilder-Lucas's
principal asked her to complete a questionnaire that included questions
concerning the try-outs; in response to the questions, Gilder-Lucas
56
The principal then told
raised her own concerns about the try-outs}
57
Gilder-Lucas her contract would. not be renewed} Gilder-Lucas filed
158
suit.
The Eleventh Circuit, relying on Garcetti, detertnined that
Gilder-Lucas had no First Amendment protections for her responses to
the questionnaire as requested by her supervisor because she had
been asked to fill out the questionnaire as the cheerleader sponsor and
159
she was therefore not speaking as citizen.
Responding to a school
administration-drafted questionnaire would hardly seem to be an official
duty of any extracurricular faculty sponsor unless it was a common
practice with the football coach, the Academic Decathlon sup.ervisor,
and the National Honor Society faculty advisor. However, refusing to
respond to the questionnaire would have been insubordination.
Consequently, whether this was really within her job description was
irrelevant to the extent the school administration had expanded GilderLucas's official duties by giving her a direct order she dared not refuse.
Naive belief in the honor of doing one's job properly propelled
several school employees into the unemployment line, especially over
fiscal mismanagement. Accountability for expenditures under the
160
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) especially was the
focus of a handful of retaliation cases. In Yatzus v. Appoquinimink
Sch,o,o l District, Olga Yatzus, a school psychologist with more than
twenty years of experience, had been hired by Appoquinimink School
161
District.
During_ the course of that employment, Yatzus openly
expressed her concerns about the school district's special education
bucket to'the taxpayer-funded legal representation school boards may access in legally justifying their
retaliation. Administrators' tenuous job security may account for the fact that there are nearly as many
administrators as teachers against whom school boards have retaliated for speaking on the job under
Garcetti, particularly about matters that one would assume should be protected as matters of public
concem.
154. 186 F. App'x 885 ( llth Cir. 2006).
155. /d. at 886.
156. /d.
157. /d.
158. /d.
159. /d. at 887.
160. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
161. 458 F. Supp. 2d 235, 239 (D. Del. 2006).
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162

She wrote a letter to her superintendent about her concerns,
program.
emphasizing the school district was not complying with testing
163
requirements for special education students.
Yatzus also
corresponded through her personal e-mail to a group of parents of
special education students and assisted them in claims filed with the
164
federal Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights.
At the end
of the school year, the school district's Human Resources director
informed Y atzus that the school board had not renewed her contract for
165
the following year.
Among other grounds, Yatzus sued the school
district on First Amendment grounds, claiming the school district had
retaliated for her correspondence to district administrators and her
166
assistance to the parents group.
In her deposition, Yatzus asserted
that her correspondence and her work with the parents were part of her
job responsibilities as a school psychologist, '"to report what [she]
perceived as illegal behavior' and to assist parents with the [Office of
167
Civil Rights] complaints."
That evidence was enough for the district
court to detertnine, as a matter of law, that Garcetti compelled the same
result for Yatzus: Yatzus was acting as a public employee during her
official duties and not as a private citizen on a matter of public concern,
168
and the school board was well within its rights to discharge her.
Less than a month later, the same federal district upheld the contract
non-renewal of another school psychologist in Houlihan v. Sussex
169
Technical School District.
In Houlihan, the psychologist
continuously tried to bring the attention of the school district as well as
of the special education supervisor to deficiencies in the school's
170
compliance with the IDEA.
The school board eventually voted to not
171
renew her contract.
The district court ultimately granted the school
district's motion to dismiss the psychologist's First Amendment
162.
163.
164.
165.

!d. at 241.
/d.
/d.
/d. at 242. In addition, Yatzus had the unfortunate experience of having her supervisor make
unwanted sexual advances to her. !d. at 239. After the school district investigated and disciplined the
supervisor, Yatzus's professional life took a tum for the worse, with the superintendent seeming to birddog her every move and issuing numerous reprimands to her file. !d. at 240 41.
166. /d. at 242.
167. !d. at 245 (first alteration in original).
168. /d. Yatzus's deposition was taken before Garcetti was handed down. !d. at 246. Obviously,
Yatzus was attempting to establish that she was acting on a matter of public concern when she was
deposed. See id. After Garcetti, Yatzus attempted to qualify the language in her deposition with an
affidavit. /d. She was unsuccessful. /d. at 24 7.
169. 461 F. Supp. 2d 252 (D. Del. 2006).
170. /d. at 256.
171. /d.
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retaliation claim because her complaint had alleged that "her job duties
always
entailed
reporting
alleged
incidences
of IDEA
172
noncompliance."
With such a clear-cut concession, her reports were
.d eemed within her official duties, and Garcetti militated that she had no
173
claim as a matter of law under the First Amendment.
In Ryan v. Shawnee Mission Unified School District No. 512,
similarly treated was a physical therapist who advocated for more
174
physical therapy for special education students in her school district.
Her ·speech "owe[d] its existence· to" her professional responsibilities,
and hence she was speaking as an employee like Ceballos and not as a
175
citizen.
She was not protected from retaliation under the First
176
Amendment
Reporting mismanagement of funds in another federally funded
program was also often within the official duties Barbara Casey,
Superintendent of West Las Vegas Independent School District for
177
about fifteen months.
One of her administrative responsibilities was
acting as chief executive officer of the school district's Head Start
178
program.
During Casey's tenure, the Head Start director passed along
information concerning funding problems with the program because of
79
participants' underreporting income to become eligible_l
Casey
reported these problems several times to the school board president and
180
the board itself.
When the school board failed to act, Casey instructed
the director to report the problems to the federal Head Start regional
office, which investigated and ordered the school district to reimburse
181
more than half a million dollars.
For all her efforts, the school board
demoted her to assistant superintendent then refused to renew her
.

.

.

172. /d. at 260.
173. Id Ironically, the court refused to dismiss her complaint on the count asserting retaliation
under the Rehabilitation Act because she was advocating on behalf of the disabled, actions protected
from retaliation by the Act itself. !d. at 257-59; see also Ryan v. Shawnee Mission Unified Sch. Dist.
No. 512, 437 F. Supp. 2d 1233; 1259 (D. Kan. 2006). In the Ryan case, a physical therapist was forced
to resign after a series of events during which she advocated for increased services to special education
students. /d. at 1239-45. These activitie.s were. protected from retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act,
and summary judgment was entered in favor of the therapist. /d.
174. 437 F. Supp. 2d at 1249.
175. /d. at 1251. Her controversial speech occurred in several contexts, most of which were
actually while doing her job: team meetings; phone calls and e-.·mails concerning student equipment
needs; staff meetings; and the like in communicating inforrnation critical for her providing services. /d.
at 1249-51.
176~ /d. at 1251.
177. Casey v. W. Las Vegas lndep. Sch. Dist, 473 F.3d 1323, 1325 (I Oth Cir. 2007).
178. /d.
179. /d. at 1326.
180. /d.
181. /d.
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182

contract for the following year.
On the school board's motion for
summary judgment, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit deterrnined that Garcetti mandated Casey had no First
Amendment protection for her reporting of the fiscal problems in the
183
Head Start program.
Because she had a duty to report financial
wrongdoing to the federal program, she was acting within her official
184
duties.
Another instance of punishing an educational employee for Head
Start fiscal problems is Dennis v. Putnam County School District, where
the fiscal officer of a Head Start program in Georgia was forced to
185
resign her post.
She alleged she was being made a scapegoat for
reporting her concerns that the Head Start director and his executive
186
assistant made unauthorized purchases with federal funds.
The
district court determined that, based on her duties as fiscal officer,
reporting financial fraud was within her official although
unenunciated duties as a matter of law because her report was
"related" to her official tasks: paying bills, requesting funds, approving
purchase requisitions and orders, reconciling bank statements,
maintaining accurate records, and carrying out the day-to-day fiscal
187
operations.
Furthermore, the fiscal officer conceded in her deposition
188
that reporting financial misconduct was part of her job.
189
Consequently, Garcetti removed her First Amendment protection.
Norma Cavazos was a high school principal against whom a school
board retaliated when the board reassigned her to another school after
she disciplined the son of the school board's vice president and reported
190
him to the local police officials.
Because disciplining students was
182. /d. at 1327.
183. /d. at 1331.
184. /d.
185. No. 5:05-CV-07, 2007 WL 891517, at *1-3 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 21, 2007).
186. /d.
187. !d. at *4.
188. /d.
189. ld. at *5. A similar result inured to a university employee whose official duties required she
report mismanagement and fraud in student financial aid files. Battle v. Bd. of Regents, 468 F.3d 755
(II th Cir. 2006). Her contract was not renewed after she reported her concerns to the president of the
university. /d. at 761-62.
190. Cavazos v. Edgewood lndep. Sch. Dist.,210 F. App'x 414, 415 (5th Cir. 2006). This
discipline was imposed after he was apprehended on school grounds with marijuana in his possession.
Cavazos v. Edgewood lndep. Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 948,952-53 (W.O. Tex. 2005), ajJ'd, 210 F.
App'x 414 (5th Cir. 2006). See also Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist., No. CVOS-272, 2007 WL
420256 (D. Idaho Feb. 2, 2007) (holding that a school safety specialist's duties included speech about
student safety and discipline); Cole v. Anne Arundel County Bd. of Educ., No. CCB-05-1579, 2006 WL
3626888, at *6 (D. Md. Nov. 30, 2006) (holding that a school bus driver was not protected under the
First Amendment for her complaints about discipline problems and bus safety because they were
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within her official duties. as principal, Cavazos was unprotected pursuant
191
to Garcetti~
Unfortunately, the fact-based analysis for this official
duties analysis is unclear, even from the more detailed district court
192
opinion, and was reached as a matter oflaw.
In Morris-Hayes v. Board of Education of Chester Union Free School
District, a New York court followed, more closely than the· Cavazos
court, the Garcetti caution to review the facts in the record to conduct an
official duties analysis. In this case, a principal in New York had a
193
couple of problems that resulted in her losing her job.
One of those
problems was that, because of the potential for favoritism, she refused a
194
school board member's request for special class placement.
In one of
several opinions issued in that case, the Second Circuit remanded the
matter to the district court for additional fact-finding to determine if the
principal's acts were within her official duties for purposes of applying
195
Garcetti to the proceedings.
Although it would seem fairly obvious
that special class placements would be within a principal's typical
official duties, the court at least did the principal the courtesy of treating
the matter ,as a question of fact.
In D'Angelo v. School Board, the official duties fact inquiry resolved
itself against the principal with his admission that, when he pursued
charter conversion for his Florida high school, he was acting as a
196
principal.
Because of an unsatisfactory appraisal of his school's
performance, the newly hired D'Angelo pursued state procedures for
converting to a charter school, including attending a seminar, leading
197
staff meetings, and forming study committees.
He undertook these
actions because "in good conscience [he] could not continue the practice
of providing an inferior e·ducational opportunity[, and he] would be
remiss in [his] duties . , ~ if [he] did not explore any and all possibilities
198
to improve the quality of education at [the school].''
He was
tertninated for his efforts then he filed suit, asserting that he was fired
for his speech associated with his charter school conversion efforts. The

consistent with her official duties).
191. Cavazos, 210 F. App'x at415.
192. See Cavazos, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 959-60. Pe.rhaps of most significance is that the student's
discipline was meted out in accordance with school district policy. !d. at 953. Otherwise, the Fifth
Circuit seemed to detennine Cavazos's duties as a matter of law; contrary to Garcetti's instruction .
193. Morris~Hayes v. Bd. ofEduc., 423 F.3d 153, 155-156 (2dCir. 2005).
194. ld. The principal was also a Major in the United States Army Reserve, and some individual
school members expressed concerns about the amount of time her military obligations took~ /d. at 155.
195. Morris-Hayes v. Bd. of Educ., 211 F. App'x 28, 29 (2d Cir. 2007).
196. 497 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir; 2007).
197. /d. at 1206.
198. /d. (third, fi.fth, and sixth alterations in origina1).
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Eleventh Circuit rewarded his conscientiousness by denying him First
Amendment protection, holding that his admissions nullified the need to
199
actually examine his official duties.
Only federal law prevents a school board from retaliating against
educators for actually fulfilling their duties. A small handful of federal
civil rights statutes have anti-retaliation provisions: persons who have
brought complaints under, or otherwise criticized the conduct of, a
20
federal program may not be punished by their employer. ° For
instance, Olga Yatzus was unsuccessful in fending off discipline under
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act but was more successful
in proceeding with her claim that the school district retaliated against her
in violation of Title VII: she had reported her supervisor's sexual
201
misconduct.
The IDEA does not have anti-retaliation provisions but
202
Title VII does.
Also inoculated from Garcetti by federal law was Cheryl Peters,
Director of Gifted Education and Magnet Programs, whose contract was
203
not renewed.
The impetus for the non-renewal was Peters's
204
opposition to racially discriminatory school board practices.
Because
Peters's lawsuit implicated both Title VI and First Amendment
retaliation, the court refused to separate the two for purposes of the
205
Garcetti analysis.
The court did not see Garcetti's changing the Title
VI jurisprudence on retaliation; hence, the court's threshold
consideration had to hinge on the civil rights law and not on the First
206
Amendment and the employee's official duties.
Given how little time had passed between Garcetti and when these
cases were handed down, the courts evidently had little time to prepare
for the Garcetti inquiry into official-duty status of the speech. As a

199. /d. at 1210. This was clearly an instance where a plaintiff got caught in the notch between
his teunination in 2004 and Garcetti's hand-down date. The principal and amici attempted to ameliorate
the damage of his admissions by characterizing them as "moral obligations as a human being and not his
responsibilities as a principal," but the court was having none of it, instead relying on the mechanical
application of the official-duties analysis of Garcetti. /d. at 121 0-11.
200. For example, under the Americans with Disabilities Act, "[n]o person shall discriminate
against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this
chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
·investigation, ·proceeding·, or ·hearing under·this chapter." 42 ·U·.S:C. ·§·l2203(a)-(2000).
201. Yatzus v. Appoquinimink Sch. Dist., 458 F. Supp. 2d 235, 244 (D. Del. 2006).
202. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000).
203. Peters v. Sch. Bd., No. 2:0lcv120, 2007 WL 295618, at *1 (E.D. Va. Jan. 26, 2007).
204. /d.
205. ld. at *3.
206. /d. Other anti-retaliation provisions can be found under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000),
the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794 (2000 & Supp. V 2005), and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
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consequence, some courts took liberties with the nature of the inquiry as
a question of fact to reach ill-advised and presumptuous decisions as a
matter of law. In addition, the respective plaintiffs often found
themselves confronting a Garcetti defense mid-litigation, a defense for
which they had clearly not prepared themselves, viz.. many of them
proudly conceded that these instances of speech arose out of their duties,
taking pride in doing a job well done in the face of retaliatory actions by
their employers. Now, much to their horror, they have to argue to the
court to save their jobs that they have minimal job expectations and
that they do only the minimal job expectations so that any speech for
which they may be punished will not be characterized as official-duty
speech. Chances are good that plaintiffs will become more sophisticated
in the future. Chances are less good, unfortunately, that courts will be
any better prepared to differentiate among educator tasks in order to
winnow out only the official-duty speeches, perhaps because the whole
exercise is so counterintuitive. This problem is especially exacerbated
by the inability of courts to decide whether to protect job-related
speech as opposed to official-duty speech -or not.
.

B.

.

HNo

.

Good Deed Goes Unpunished":

207

Job-Related Speech

As alluded to in the previous section, courts since Garcetti have
exhibited a willingness to stretch the meaning of a school employee's
official duties to Justify school board retaliations. In doing so, they have
created a twilight zone of speech that is not really official-duty speech.
This category of job~related yet not official-duty speech has developed
8
from either a too-broad job description by the employer2° or from a
decision by a court as a question of law as to what the employee
should have done on the job rather than what the employee was required
to do. The lengths to which courts went to justify the school boards'
actions are truly interesting. They went outside the traditional notion of
school employees' official duties and explained that those employees
would not have had the wherewithal to speak on the subject matter at all
but for their status as school employees.
Perhaps the starting point for demarcating_ job-related speech as
distinct from official-duty speech is to the examine cases in which the
207. This quotation has been variously attributed to Oscar Wilde, ~ee The Phrase Finder, Re: Hno
good deed goes unpunished," http://www.phrases.org.uk/bulletin_board/27/messages/317.html (last
visited June 4, 2007), and to Clare Booth Luce, see BrainyQuote~ Clare Booth Luce Quotes,
http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/c/clarebooth 1255ll.html (last visited June 4, 2007).
208. "We reject, however, the suggestion tha.t employers can restrict employees' rights by creating
excessively broad job descriptions.'' Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 4 I0, 424 (2006) (citing id. at 431 n.2
(Souter, J., dissenting)).
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educator prevailed. For instance, the district court in Pittman v.
Cuyahoga Valley Career Center chose to interpret Garcetti's official
duties inquiry rather broadly in the case of a substitute teacher who,
among other acts of expression, wrote a memorandum to his
209
superintendent concerning parking lot safety.
The court decided that
Garcetti's inquiry mandated the court to look at whether the speech was
210
required to determine whether it was an official duty.
Pittman's
memorandum concerning parking lot safety was not required by his
211
official duties, and therefore Garcetti did not apply.
Similarly
decided was McMahon v. New York City Board of Education, where a
high school chemistry teacher was not constrained by Garcetti inasmuch
as his barrage of letters was not within his official duties and, but for a
few instances dealing with matters of public concern, primarily dealt
212
with his personal animus against school administrators.
And oddly
decided was Montie v. Westwood Heights School District, in which a
teacher's probationary contract was not renewed because he wore a T213
shirt to school that said "Working Without a Contract."
The district
court mentioned the recently decided Garcetti case, and then it
proceeded to start the analysis from the point of establishing_ that
Montie's speech was on a matter of public concern, presumably
because as a matter of law union speech is not within a teacher's
214
official duties.
These were the easier questions to resolve for the
courts involved. Indeed, they seemed to conclude that these educators
had spoken outside their official duties as a matter of law.
The more problematic cases are those where the speech is job-related:
it arises out of information gleaned on the job, but the speech itself is not
an official duty. In instances where the information was gathered on the
job but such information-gathering was not an official duty, the courts
tended to find that Garcetti did not foreclose First Amendment claims.
For example, the district court in Wilcoxon v. Red Clay Consolidated
209. 451 F. Supp. 2d 905,910-11 (N.D. Ohio 2006).
210. /d. at 929.
211. /d. The Pittman court used a "job-relatedness" analysis, id., which would suggest that the
court was seeking something beyond official duties to support the schoo1 board's position. In any event,
the court proceeded to look at Pittman's official duties. !d. As it turned out,, Pittman's memorandum
was not on a matter ofpublic concern so the court's· Connick·analysis prohibited ·Pittman from pursuing
a First Amendment claim on this and other personal issues on which Pittman spoke. /d. at 929~30.
212. No. CV-01-6205, 2006 WL3680624, at *1, *&-7 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2006).
213. 437 F. Supp. 2d 652, 653 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
214. ld. at 654; see also Bowers v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., No. Civ. 3:06CV00041,
2006 WL 3041269 (W.D. Va. Oct. 24, 2006) (university emp1oyee avoided Garcetti's impact because
the e-mail she transmitted from her work account was not within her official duties). Montie still lost
under the Connick analysis, but the opinion suggests that matters of more urgent public_concern, such as
labor unrest, merit broader protections than Garcetti offers. Montie, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 654-55.
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School District Board ofEducation determined that a physical education
teacher's journal of a team-teacher's absences was outside Garcetti's
reach: the teacher was not employed to monitor his fellow teacher and
215
his official teaching duties did not mandate that he do so.
Similarly,
in Black v. Columbus Public Schools, an assistant principal reported that
216
her principal was having an affair with a parent volunteer.
Then she
217
was transferred to a less prestigious schoo1.
In analyzing the sch.ool
board's motion to file a supplemental motion for summary judgment to
account for the recently decided Garcetti, the court detertnined that,
even if the school board had not waived the issue based on Sixth Circuit
precedent, it still could not prevail because the assistant had no official
duties that required her to supervise her principal or even to report
218
misconduct of her principal.
.

.

The court treated the job-related speech for which Superintendent
Barbara Casey sought First Amendment protection in Casey v. West Las
219
Vegas Independent School District in a similar manner to Wilcoxon-.
Casey was concerne-d that the school board was violating the New
220
Mexico Open Meetings Act by failing to give proper notice.
She filed
a written complaint with the New Mexico Attorney General's Office
221
when the scho,ol board failed to heed her concems.
The Attorney
General's Office- determined that the school board had indeed violated
222
the open meetings act and ordered it take corrective action.
In this
instance, Garcetti did not foreclose Casey;s reporting problems with the
223
open meetings act because that was outside her official duties.
According to the record before the court, Casey had no responsibility for
the board's meetings and was not responsible for the board's compliance
224
with the act.
Hence, she was acting within her protected First
225
Amendment right when she reported to the Attorney General's office.
Perhaps of greater concern are the courts that examine "job226
relatedness" to slot speech into a teacher's official duties or the courts

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
2006).

437 F. Supp. 2d 235,243 (D. Del. 2006).
No. 2:-96-CV-326, 2006 WL 2385359,at*l (S.D. Ohio Aug. 17, 2006).
/d. at *2.
/d. at *5.
473 F.3d 1323 (I Oth Cir. 2007).
/d. at 1326.
/d.
/d.
/d. at 1332-33.
/d. at 1.332.
/d. at 1332-33.
See, e.g., Pittman v. Cuyahoga Valley Career Ctr., 451 F. Supp. 2d 905, 929 (N.D. Ohio
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that strip protection from '"speech [that has] official significance ... and
227
Such analyses suggest
could not have been made by public citizens."
that courts go beyond the employee's official duties and analyze speech
that is just related to employment, relying on information the employee
would not have had but for the job. This speech is in no way required of
the job and therefore not within an educator's official duties. However,
but for the job, the speech would not have occurred.
Illustrative of this elevation of job-related speech to official-duty
speech is Williams v. Dallas Independent School District, where a report
228
on the alleged misuse of athletic funds was grounds for discharge.
Gregory Williams was Athletic Director and Head Football Coach at a
229
high school within the Dallas school district.
Williams, at various
times, tried to get the office manager to inform him about the state of
accounts for athletic expenditures, including by a memorandum copied
230
When Williams received no responses to his
to the school principal.
inquiries, he finally wrote, during football season, a memorandum
concerning the finances of the athletic department to the principal
231
Four days later the principal removed Williams as athletic
himself.
director, and in the spring, the school district decided not to renew
232
Williams's contract.
Williams sued, asserting the school district had
233
The Fifth
retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment.
Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the
234
Although the court determined
school district by relying on Garcetti.
that Williams's official duties did not require him to write a
memorandum to the principal about the athletic funds, his duties as
athletic director did encompass the subject matter of the memorandum,
235
the daily operations of the high school's athletic department.
The
budgetary concerns expressed in the memorandum were not expressed
as those of a citizen but from a specialized knowledge he only had
227. Cole v. Anne Arundel County Bd. ofEduc., No. CCB-05-1579, 2006 WL 3626888, at *6 (D.
Md. Nov. 30, 2006); see also Ward v. Bd. ofTrs. ofChL State Univ., No. 06 C 1360,2007 WL 1512419
(N.D. Ill. May 22, 2007) (holding that university administrator's retransmission of an e-mail she had
received concerning criminal allegations about a dean was punishable by Garcetti as she had been
targeted to receive the original e-mail because of her administrative position).
228. 480 F.3d 689 (5th Cir. 2007).
229. Id. at 690.
230. ld.
231. /d. at 690-91.
232. /d. at 691. The principal was apparently unhappy with the tenor of Williams's memorandum
when he suggested that he had "found that there is a network of friends and house rules, which govern
practices here at L.G. Pinkston High School." /d.
233. !d.
234. !d. at 692~94.
235. !d. at 694.
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236

Thus, the court applied
because of his job with the school district.
237
Garcetti and rejected Williams's claims.
In one of the oddest cases of job-related retaliation, a middle school
teacher was punished for filing a verbal complaint with the state's
Department of Children and Families (DCF). Robert Pagani was a
238
middle-school science teacher in Connecticut.
Two middle school
students advised Pagani that a substitute science teacher had shared with
students a photograph album that not only memorialized the teacher's
European trip but also included a nude picture of him with two nude
239
females.
Pagani reRorted the incident to his principal but was told not
40
to report it to DCF.
Pagani did so anyway, and there followed a
bizarre string of events demoting, reassigning, and finally reinstating
241
Pagani.
The district court determined that Pagani was not protected
because reporting child abuse is mandated by the Connecticut reporting
242
statutes and is therefore a legal requirement of teachers' jobs.
According to the court, inasmuch as this duty is mandated for teachers,
Pagani was not speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern but
243
was acting within his official job duties.
The court's reasoning in relying on Garcetti to rule against Pagani's
First Amendment claim is more than a little confusing. First, the facts
244
revealed that Pagani's superiors had told Pagani not to file a report;
hence, Pagani's superiors believed such a report was not within his
official duties. Second, Pagani perhaps in a surfeit of moral concern
and probably before Garcetti was handed down conceded in his
amended complaint that reporting child abuse incidents was part of his
245
professional duties.
Last, the pertinent Connecticut reporting statute
lists numerous individuals and entities, other than teachers, who are
246
mandated to report child abuse.
The statute makes reporting a duty
236. /d.
237. /d.
238. Pagani v. Meriden Bd. ofEduc., No. 3:05-CV-01115, 2006 WL 3791405, at *1 (D. Conn.
Dec. 19, 2006).
239. /d.
240. /d. at *2.
241 . /d. The factual record in the opinion is unclear, but apparently Pagani was tenured or had
otherwise secured some sort of contractual or statutory job protection that prohibited his being
dismissed. /d.
242. /d. at *4.
243. /d. at *4.
244. /d. at $2.
245. /d. at *3.
246. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-101 (2007). This statute covers the following mandated reporters:
Any physician or surgeon licensed under the provisions of chapter 370, any resident
physician or intern in any hospital in this state, whether or not so licensed, any registered
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but does not make reporting a job requirement. In Connecticut, the
statute imposes punishment for failure to report fines and mandatory
247
training but not job discipline.
Although perhaps a too-fine point,
state legislatures imposed this legal duty on numerous classes of
citizens, including teachers, because of the information gleaned on the
job, thereby making the statutory duty a condition of citizenship, not a
condition of employment. This is particularly so when the penalty for
248
failure to report in some states is punishable as a crime.
Thus,
because information is gleaned because of the teacher's position, speech
about the information may be punishable as an official duty.
The same lack of protection inured to New York City public school
teachers w·ho reported that their supervisor inappropriately touched and
249
sexually harassed students and other teachers.
The supervisor was
tertninated when the allegations were substantiated; the teachers who
reported these problems along with numerous other matters alleged
250
they were retaliated against by being harassed then forced to resign.
In addressing their First Amendment claims, the court determined that
the teachers' reports were not protected because school district policy
251
mandated reporting.
As a consequence, the reports were undertaken
252
as an official duty.

nurse, licensed practical nurse, medica] examiner, dentist, denta] hygienist, psychologist,
coach of intramural or interscholastic athletics, school teacher, school principal, school
guidance counselor, school paraprofessional, school coach, social worker, police officer,
juvenile or adult probation officer, juvenile or adult parole officer, member of the clergy,
phar rnacist, physical therapist, optometrist, chiropractor, podiatrist, mental health
professional or physician assistant, any person who is a licensed or certified emergency
medical services provider, any person who is a licensed or certified alcohol and drug
counselor, any person who is a licensed marital and family therapist, any person who is a
sexual assault counselor or a battered women's counselor as defined in section 52-146k,
any person who is a licensed professional counselor, any person paid to care for a child in
any public or private facility, chi1d day care center, group day care home or family day
care home licensed by the state, any employee of the Department of Children and
Families, any employee of the Department of Public Health who is responsible for the
licensing of child day care centers, group day care homes, family day care homes or
youth camps, the Child Advocate and any employee of the Office of Child Advocate.

!d. § 17a-101(b) (footnote omitted). See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 51A (2007) (obligating
teachers, administrators, counselors, and day-care workers to report); NEB. REV. STAT.§ 28-711 (2007)
(any "school employee" has an obligation to report).
247. CONN. GEN. STAT.§ 17a-l0la (2007). But see FLA. STAT. § 1006.061 (2007) {child abuse
reporting requirements must be posted in schools).
248. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 31-33-22-1 (2007) (failure to report child abuse is Class B
misdemeanor).
249. Pearson v. Bd. ofEduc., 499 F. Supp. 2d 575, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
250. /d. at 584, 589.
251. /d. at 589.
252. /d.
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Somewhat similar is Trujillo v. Board of Education where a high
sc·hool aerospace instructor in an Air Force ROTC program, Trujillo,
filed suit after being placed on administrative leave for alleged
253
misconduct.
In his First Amendment claim, Trujillo asserted that he
had been punished for reporting his new superior's lack of certification
from the . Federal Aviation Administration and alleged abuse of
254
students.
Garcetti was handed down in the midst of the suit and was
255
latched onto by the supervisor as a defense to Trujillo's claim.
Although these two events could be split down the middle the first
being job-related spee·ch and the other being official-duty speech the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals correctly remanded the case for fact256
finding to make that determination.
Divining a court's decision when job~related speech is involved is not
easy.; it is perhaps harder than deciding what a court will do with
official-duty speech. As with its treatment of official-duty speech, the
Garcetti decision created a vacuum for fact-finding inquiries in jobrelated speech cases. Exacerbating the problem is that some courts are
making decisions as questions of law rather than engaging in factfinding as set out in Garcetti. Furthermore, a significant time lag existed
between the law and litigation strategy·. The unfortunate outcome may
be that, as school boards become more willing to expand the official
duties of their employees to encompass job-related speech, the more
teachers and administrators will refrain from doing all the little extras
that make the school boards accountable to the public.
C.

'(A Pall of Orthodoxy

1
':

257

Academic Speech

One of the chief criticisms made by the dissenting Justices in Garcetti
258
was the opinion's open threat to academic freedom.
Indeed, the
Court's majority, sounding defensive in the face of this and other
withering attacks by the dissenting Justices, cordoned off its decision
from academic freedom:
There is some argument that expression related to academic scholarship
253. 212 F. App'x 760, 763 (1Oth Cir. 2007).
254. Jd. at 764.
255. /d.
256. /d. at 764· 65.
257. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents,_385 U.S. 589,603 (1967).
258. "'I have to hope that today's majority does not mean to imperil First Amendment protection
of academic freedom in public colleges and universities, whose teachers necessarily speak and write
'pursuant to official duties. 'u Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 438-39 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003); Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603; Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, J54 U.S. 234t 250 (1957)).
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or classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional interests that
are not fully accounted for by this Court's customary employee-speech
jurisprudence. We need not, and for that reason do not, decide whether
the analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case
259
involving speech related to scholarship or teaching.

Apparently, some courts paid no attention to this declaration.
260
The Fourth Circuit, no stranger to academic freedom disputes, used
Garcetti as a new weapon against a teacher's discretion in classroom
instruction.
In Lee v. York County School Division, a school
administrator removed controversial materials from a Spanish teacher's
261
The teacher wanted to post the materials,
classroom bulletin board.
including a National Day of Prayer poster, a news article outlining
religious differences between presidential candidates, a news article
about the United States Attorney General's Bible study sessions, and
262
news articles about the death of a missionary.
The teacher believed
263
that these postings would be useful to his students.
The court
determined that, because these materials were of a curricular nature a
fact that Lee had conceded they were not matters of public concern as
64
a matter of law02 Reinforcing Lee's concession, the court also as a
matter of law determined they were curricular because they were
poste:d and therefore had the imprimatur of the high school and were
265
Therefore, because the speech was curricular, it
designed to teach.
was employment-related and therefore not protected by the First
266
Amendment.
The Fourth Circuit thus reduced the controversy from a
First Amendment matter to a mere employment dispute, an odd result
considering the materials really had nothing to do with teachin-g Spanish
259. ld. at 425 (majority opinion).
260. See Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998) (en bane). In
Boring, the Fourth Circuit contlated the Pickering-Connick analysis freedom of' employee speech
analysis with the freedom of student speech analysis in Hazelwood School District v. Kuh/meier, 484
U.S. 260 (1988}. Boring, 136 F.3d at 368-69. In so doing, the court detennined that a teacher's
selection of a controversial play about a dysfunctional, single-parent family was inappropriate on the
basis of one parental complaint after the parent had signed a pennission stateme.nt to see the· play. Jd. at
366. The principal had notice that the teacher was doing the play under the then-extant school district
procedures, but he had undertaken no independent study of the play. /d. The court detennined this
teacher's play selection was worthy of "discipline'; because it involved nothing more than an
employment dispute. /d. at 368. Perhaps more accurately, the dispute was an effort. by the school
principal and the county board of education to scapegoat the teacher to shield them from controversy.
/d. at 374 (Hamilton, l; dissenting).
261. 484 F.3d 687, 690 (4th Cir. 2007).
262~ ld.
263. /d. at 691-92.
264. !d. at 696-97.
265. /d. at 697-98.
266. /d. at 700.
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and the teacher's employment was never in jeopardy he had sued to be
267
allowed to exercise his speech rights to post the materials.
The
reasons for entangling academic freedom even if by another nameare just not apropos.
Also oddly decided was Caruso v. Massapequa Union Free School
268
District.
Jillian Caruso was an elementary teacher for a year and a
half for the school district _until she resigned from her third-grade
269
The event leading up to her resignation
position in January, 2005.
270
As an active
arose during the preceding fall's presidential campaign.
member of the Republican Party and an ardent supporter of President
George W. Bush, she talked to 'h er third-grade class about her
271
During that fall, Caruso posted an official White House
activities.
272
273
photograph of Bush in her classroom.
She claimed her principal
made her remove the Bush photograph and forced her to resign her
274
The school district's
position, an act of constructive discharge-.
version of events detailed how the third-grade classes participated in a
mock election during that fall and that Caruso had been given the option
of either removing the Bush photograph or of adding a photograph of
Senator John Keny, the other presidential candidate, for purposes of
275
balance in that election.
On the school district's motion for summary
267. !d. at 691-92. An alternative decision might have been better premised on harassment or
church·state arguments~ See, e.g.-, Piggee v. Carl Sandburg CoiL, 464 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2006). Martha
Louise Pigge_e was a part-time c_osmetology instructor at Carl Sandburg College who regularly
interjected her religious beliefs into her instruction and regularly gave out religious tracts to selected
students. !d. at 672. After she gave a gay student two religious tracts attacking the sinfulness of
homosexuality during instructional time, the college decided not to retain her for violating its anti-sexual
harassment policy. !d. at 668. Piggee's First Amendment cJaim asserted, in part, that she should be able
to discuss religious matters with students. !d. at 670. The Seventh Circuit detennined that Garcetti was
inapplicable to this situation except to emphasize the public school employer's interest in ensuring that
appropriate classroom instruction occur: the college was concerned that Piggee's religious activities
impeded the instructional curriculum because so many students were uncomfortable with her
proselytizing. !d. at _672. Having detennined that .Piggee's actions fel1 within the ambit of its anti·
sexual harassment policy, the- college was well within its rights to restrain Piggee's actions and
thereafter refuse to keep her on its faculty. /d. at 673-74. Throughout, the Seventh Circuit was cautious
to tiptoe around the academic freedom issues. !d. at 670-71. The distinction between the Seventh
Circuit's decision here and its_later decision in Mayer v. Monroe County Community School Corp., 474
F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 160 (2007), is the difference between the- higher
education institution in Piggee and the K-12 public school corporation in Mayer.
268. 478 F. Supp. 2d 377 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
269. !d. at 380.
270. /d.
271. !d.
272. !d.
273. Caruso alleged that the principal was married to a liberal elected official and kept a picture of
Senator Hil1ary Clinton in her office. /d.
274. !d. at 380-81.
275. !d. at 38L The less glamorous problem was that Caruso was not a very good teacher. !d.
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judgment against Caruso'·s First Amendment claim, the federal district
court first considered the Garcetti analysis, addressing the problem as
276
official-duty speech.
The district court gave lip-service to Justice
Kennedy's caution about classroom instruction and then confused
Caruso's classroom activities as something other than classroom
instruction, going off on a short jaunt about job descriptions and official
277
duties.
Then the court further confused the matter. It asserted that
"whether an employee speaks pursuant to his official duties and whether
such speech falls into the category of protected speech present questions
of law for the court," but it ruled that summary judgment was
inappropriate because there remained numerous questions of fact,
especially concerning the nature of Caruso's duties pursuant to
218
Garcetti.
As best can be wrested from this analysis, classroom speech
may or may not be protected, but if it is part of a teacher's official
duties, then it is not protected.
The Seventh Circuit was less ambiguous in Mayer v. Monroe County
Community School Corp., when it relied on Garcetti to uphold the
dismissal of a probationary elementary teacher for her in-class
279
instruction based on materials approved by the school district.
In
doing so, the court left no doubt that kindergarten through twelfth-grade
teachers within its jurisdiction have no academic freedom. Deborah
Mayer, while teaching current events, was asked by one of her students
280
whether she had participated in any political demonstrations.
The
discussion surrounded instructional materials approved by the school
281
district.
According to the court, she replied that "when she passed a
demonstration against this nation's military operations in Iraq and saw a
placard saying 'Honk for Peace', [sic] she honked her car's horn to show
282
support for the demonstrators."
After "some parents'' complained,
283
Mayer's teaching contract was not renewed for a second year.
276. Jd. at 382-83.

277. /d.
278. !d. at 384. The court also suggested that if the Garcetti-employment analysis did not apply,
then it would follow the Connick-Pickering analysis of citizen's speech on matters of public concern.
/d. at 383.
279. 474 F.3d477, 480 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 160 (2007).
280: !d. at 478.
281. Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp., No. I :04-CV-1695, 2006 WL 693555, at *2
(S.D. Ind. Mar. 10, 2006), ajJ'd, 474 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2007).
282. Mayer, 474 F.3d at 478.
283. !d. The Seventh Circuit opinion is somewhat at odds with the undisputed facts elicited
during the school district's motion for summary judgment and recounted by the district court. See
Mayer, 2006 WL 693555, at *2-9. According to those facts, Mayer taught in an alternative learning
class for children in fourth through sixth grades, in Bloomington, Indiana, hom~ of Indiana University.
/d. at *2. Every Friday, Mayer used a children's newsletter, Time f or Kids, to discuss current events. /d.
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Relying on Garcetti as the main impetus for its decision, the court
discounted notions of academic freedom and ruled that Mayer's
284
discussion of current events was within her official duties.
Because
the school district had "hired" Mayer for her speech, the school district
could restrict its teachers as the basis of its curriculum to teaching
285
However, Mayer engaged in only
speech but not opinion speech.
teaching speech, and she did not depart from the school-approved
286
curriculum.
But just to be on the safe side, the court essentially
quashed any notion that public school teachers have any academic
freedom except within the context of the curriculum and therefore within
the majority's rule because teachers' only employment is to be
Time for Kids was approved for use at her elementary school in general and in her classroom in
particular. 1d. The December 13, 2002 issue of Time for Kids featured peace marches in Washington,
D.C. to protest U.S. involvement in launching a war on Iraq. /d. One of Mayer's students asked if she
would participate in a peace march:

At that time I said, "Peace marches are going on all over the country. We even have
demonstrations here in Bloomington, Indiana. When I drive past the courthouse square
and the demonstrators are picketing I honk my hom for peace because their signs say,
'Honk for Peace.'["]
And then I went on to say that I thought that it was important for people to seek out
peaceful solutions to problems before going to war and that we train kids to be mediators
on the playground so that they can seek out peaceful solutions to their own problems and
so they won't fight and hurt each other. And that was the extent of the conversation and
the discussion.
/d. Her complaint further alleged that "[s]he stated that she thought peace was an option to war and that
peaceful solutions should be sought before going to war." /d. After only one set of parents
complained several sets of parents complained about Mayer's teaching methods but only one set of
parents complained about the First Amendment issue the school principal issued a directive that,
although the school would continue to promote peace in the classroom, teachers were not to promote
any particular foreign policy view. /d. at *3. He also cancelled the school's annual Peace Month. /d.
The Time for Kids article for December 13, 2002, Searching Iraq, included the following:
Opinion polls show that 58% of Americans would support such an attack. Still, many are
speaking out against it. A big antiwar rally is scheduled in Washington, D.C., this week.
"There are other ways to deal with [Hussein] besides bombing," says peace activist Elke
Heitmeyer. "Wars will only create more violence."
Ritu Upadhyay, Searching Iraq, TIME FOR KIDS, Dec. 13, 2002 (alteration in original) (emphasis added),
available at http://www.timeforkids.comffFK/teachers/wr/article/0,27972,397638, OO.html.
284. Mayer, 414 F.3d at 479.
285. /d.
286. See id. The court's hyperbolic attempt at analogy does not make its conclusion any more
convincing. In erecting the straw-man bad teacher who would prevail if Mayer's innocuous statement
were unpunished, the court asserted that school districts would have no authority to control teachers like
a social studies teacher who teaches inaccurate statements that Benedict Arnold was not a traitor; a
teacher who teaches religious theory rather than the text in violation of the separation of church and
state; an English teacher who is hired to teach only Moby Dick but teaches Cry; the Beloved Country
instead; and a math teacher who prefers to teach calculus over trigonometry. /d. The first teacher is
incompetent while the other three are insubordinate; these straw-men do not raise curricular concerns to
support the court's holding.
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287

govennnent speakers: "[T]he first amendment does not entitle primary
and secondary teachers, when conducting the education of captive
audiences, to cover topics, or advocate viewpoints, that depart from the
288
curriculum adopted by the school system."
Perhaps one saving grace of these decisions is that they seem limited
to politically controversial matters rather than true controversy over
curriculum. That is not to say that school boards will not use these cases
as precedent to punish teachers for classroom speech. The reality is that
these cases arise although not ':llways when a school administrator is
put into the hot seat by a couple of "offended" parents. The record
reflects no general public outcry about the substance of what these
teachers said or did in their classrooms, and a few parent complaints
necessitate only a discussion about the appropriateness of presenting
both points of view on religious and political materials. Rather than find
themselves in a bind, however, the school administrators took action
against the teacher to forestall the school boards' going after them
instead, especially if the teacher was in a more vulnerable employment
position than the administrators. However characterized, these cases are
about politics and not at all about the curriculum. Therefore, they were
not really official-duty cases. Perhaps they can be cabined as outliers
289
and not as academic freedom cases.
The speech involved in the above cases clearly runs the gamut of
activities in which teachers may be engaged as part of their jobs: official
speech, speech based on information derived only from being on the job,
and classroom speech. Setting aside for the moment classroom speech
that would otherwise be protected under academic freedom, the dividing
line between the other two types of speech is blurry. No trend is clear
except that courts seem prone to allow school boards to punish
teachers and administrators for anything said at work as necessarily
arising from the fact of the employment and thereby becoming officialduty speech. This unfortunate tendency will lead to an ever-widening
artificial range of official duties to justify these actions as "legitimate"
punitive action rather than First Amendment retaliation.
On the other hand, perhaps the trend of courts' allowing school
boards to punish faculty for things said at work hides the real dilemma
with which courts are wrestling. when are employees on the job not
citizens and therefore punishable for official-duty speech? How does a
court extrapolate a line between the employee and the citizen on the job?
287. ld. at 479-80.
288. /d. at 480.
289. However, one should not be hopeful because the Mayer opinion suggests that the Seventh
Circuit is anxious to attack academic freedom at institutions of higher education also. /d. at 480.
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That diletmna is perhaps more acute for teachers than for others, as
evidenced by the mixed results of recent cases, because their stock in
trade is speech; their entire work world requires speech. Perhaps that is
the point: either sc-hool boards can always retaliate against teachers
because they always speak only as employees, or perhaps the Garcetti
analysis is an inappropriate fit and should not be applied to teachers at
all.
. .

Ill. "BY THE WORK ONE KNows THE WORKMAN"

A.

290

Teachers' Official Duties

An easy answer to the Garcetti inquiry into teachers' official duties
would be for schools to have written job descriptions. Other than the
terms of a particular individual's contract start and end date, job
assignment, supplemental assignments like coaching, and salary a
school board would then find it difficult to enumerate official duties it
had assigned to any particular teacher. However, experienced teachers
would be hard-pressed to produce job descriptions of the positions for
which they were hired. Administrators may have an easier time of
articulating the-specific written responsibilities for which they have been
291
hired and that they must fulfill to do their jobs competently.
But
teachers have a hard time articulating what their official duties entail
other than being teachers from the time they enter the door until the time
they leave.
The question then remains, in an environment without specific,
written job descriptions, how the parties to a Garcetti proceeding will
define the undefined. Of course, school board witnesses' testimony
likely will broaden a teacher's tasks to cover nearly all on-the-job
290. This quotation has been attributed to Jean de La Fontaine. See JOHN BARTLEIT, FAMILIAR
QUOiATIONS 983 (lOth ed. 1919).
291. For example, Chicago Public Schools enumerates numerous requirements for its school
principals, among them; the competencies to:
Assess the Quality of Classroom Instruction
[I] Know and have the ability to direct the implementation of successful literacy and
mathematic strategies school-wide
[2] Possess expert knowledge of a range of effective learning theories and practices, with
the ability to model practice, and coach and assist teachers to support instructional
improvement
[3] Have_an understanding of and ability to lead standards-based instruction
[4] Be able to use data to improve instruction and student ac-hievement
Chicago
Public
Schools
Principal
Competencies,
Competencies.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2008).

http://www.oppdcps.com/downloads/
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speech, in the absence of ,any limiting direction, and especially
sufficiently broadly to justify the school board's actions. Teachers, then,
will have an incentive to testify that their official duties are narrow.
Courts inquiring into teachers' official duties should consider norms
that state legislatures have used to limit school board power to fire at
will. In other words, in the absence of an affirmative job description,
teachers' official duties should be circumscribed by negative norms for
292
Even more
which teachers may be discharged or disciplined.
protective would be those norms spelled out in a collective bargaining
agreement between the school board and its teachers because those
nortns are more protective than those minimal protections afforded by
the state. Those statutory and contractual parameters would have the
virtue of not being as subjective and self-serving as a school board's
testimony to support its grounds for retaliating.
These negative norms are inexact, but the legislative language and the
interpretive case precedent make them more exact. The fairly universal
norms for which teachers can be disciplined are as follows:
293
incompetence, neglect of duty, insubordination, immorality, unfitness
294
Incompetence is the inability to
to teach, and unprofessional condu.ct.
do the job in the technical (not instructional) sense, such as being unable
to conduct classes, unable to conununicate effectively, unable to
295
Incompetence is
supervise the class, or deficient in the su~ject matter.
a comparative norm, viewing a particular teacher's performance in the
classroom, in her professional relationships, and in her personal
problems against the standard of other teachers' performance and
296
professionalism.
Neglect of duty, on the other hand, is the failure to
perfonn and is usually some type of dereliction of duty. Such neglect to
carry out the duties of the job includes failure to tum in grades,
tardiness, use of alcohol on the premises, and failure to supervise
.

.

292. See, e.g., CAL. Eouc. COOE § 89535 (West 2007); COLO. REv. STAT. § 22-63-301 (2007);
GA. CODE ANN. § 20..:2-940 (2007); MINN. STAT. § l22A.40 subdiv. 9 (2007); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 342.865 (2007).
293. See~ e.g., JOSEPH BECKHAM, MEETING LEGAL CHALLENGES 70-77 (1996); NELDA H.
CAMBRON-MCCABE, MARTHA M. MCCARTHY & STEPHEN B. THOMAS, PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW:
TEACHERS' AND STUDENTS' RIGHTS 412--20 (5th ed. 2004); RICHARD D. STRAHAN & L. CHARLES
TURNER, THE COURTS AND THE SCROOLS: THE ·SCHOOL ADMINISTRATOR AND LEGAL RISK

MANAGEMENT TODAY 152-55 (1987).

294. CAMBRON-MCCABE, MCCARTHY & THOMAS, supra note 293, at 420--22. "(O)ther good and
just cause" might pick up the more isolated and less easy-to-categorize event such as criminal
conviction, id. at 422:-23, lack of certification, improper discipline, repeated profanity in the classroom,
and lying to a supervisor, see BECKHAM, supra note 293, at 77.
295. DAVID CARR, PROFESSIONALISM AND ETHICS IN TEACHING 151 (2000); STRAHAN &
TURNER, supra note 293, at 154.
296. STRAHAN & TURNER, supra note 293, at 154.
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297

Insubordination is a willful act; it is a refusal to obey
students.
supervisor directives or school regulations. A single act is rarely
insubordination. Rather, cause for discharge requires a pattern of
298
refusing to comply with reasonable directives.
Immorality as grounds
for teacher discharge is a rather broad term inasmuch as teachers are
viewed as student role models. Hence, the threshold for determining
when a teacher acts immorally is fairly low, although acts of moral
turpitude, criminal convictions, and sexual misconduct with students are
299
the typical grounds for immorality discipline.
Unfitness to teach is
probably more a subset of "incompetence" than an independent nornt; it
covers such things as "conduct detrimental to the operation of the
school,'' ''[e]vident unfitness for service," and mental, emotional or
300
physical incapacity.
Unprofessional conduct may encompass the
behavior disciplined under other norms, such as neglect of duty or
301
unfitness to teach.
Although school boards are wont to use this
ground for terrnination broadly, its meaning really relies on some
understanding of how teachers should comport themselves as
302
professionals, perhaps according to some set of professional ethics.

297. BECKHAM, supra note 293, at 75-76; CAMBRON-MCCABE, MCCARTHY & THOMAS, supra
note 293, at418-19; STRAHAN & TURNER, supra note 293, at 155.
298. BECKHAM, supra note 293, at 73-75; CAMBRON-MCCABE, MCCARTHY & THOMAS, supra
note 293, at 416-18; STRAHAN & TURNER, supra note 293, at 154.
299. BECKHAM, supra note 293, at 70-73; CAMBRON-MCCABE, MCCARTHY & THOMAS, supra
note 293, at 413-16; STRAHAN & TURNER, supra note 293, at 153- 54.
300. CAMBRON-MCCABE, MCCARTHY & THOMAS, supra note 293, at 421-22 {quoting Lombardo
v. Bd. of Educ., 241 N.E.2d 495, 498 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968); Woodland Joint Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Comm'n on Profl Competence, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 227 (Ct. App. 1992)).
301. /d. at 420-21 .
302. E.g., LOUIS FISCHER, DAVID SCHIMMEL & LESLIE R. STELLMAN, TEACHERS AND THE LAW
39 (6th ed. 2003). Some states even have a code of professional ethics for teachers. E.g., MINN. R.
§ 8700.7500 (2007); STATE PROF'L STANDARDS AND PRACTICES BD. FOR TEACHING, N.Y. STATE
EDUC. DEP'T, NEW YORK STATE CODE OF ETHICS FOR EDUCATORS (2002), available at
http://www.highered.nysed.gov/tcert/pdf/codeofethics.pdf (stating that a code of professional ethics
cannot be used as the basis for discipline). Most do not so teachers often rely on their own notion of
professionalism from either an innate sense of ethics or something more tangible, like the Code of Ethics
of the Education Profession espoused by the National Education Association. See NAT'L Eouc. Ass'N,
CODE OF ETHICS OF THE EDUCATION PROFESSION (1975), available at http://www.nea.org/
aboutnea/code.html.
This last ground for statutory and contractual discharge is unprofessional conduct and in
itself illustrates the strange dynamic that Garcetti has imposed on the teaching profession. That code of
professionalism whatever its tenns often impels teachers to speak out about the nature of the job
itself, especially matters of mismanagement or misconduct. This is surely what impelled some of the
teachers in the Garcetti cases to insist that they had official obligations to speak because they sincerely
believed their self-imposed sense of professional ethics demanded it. Indeed, they were proud to admit
that they were so attentive to their professional responsibilities. With the continuing onslaught of
Garcetti cases, however, teachers are going to begin retracting their notions of professionalism in their
own self-interests.
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A teacher's official duties therefore can be limited to behaviors for
which the states have ascribed sufficient importance that, when
perfonned badly, may result in discipline. Thus, a teacher's affirmative
and official duties include the following: (I) be technically competent,
which includes the physical, mental and psychological presence to
conduct and supervise a class, to communicate effectively, and to be
proficient in the subject area; (2) conform to the technical work-day
requirements, like attendance, physical appearance, timeliness,
recordkeeping, and fulfilling supervisory duties; (3) follow school
district regulations and supervisors' directives, including handbooks and
school board policies; (4) abide by and fulfill all responsibilities and
duties imposed by all state and federal laws common law, statutory
and regulatory applying to that position or that activity; (5) comport
oneself in one's private life so as not to reflect poorly on the school
district, particularly avoiding bringing one's private problems into the
workplace; (6) treat colleagues and non-certified staff in a professional
303
manner. Any speech in these areas would be official-duty speech.
Cut and dried as they are, these guidelines reflect teachers'
affirtnative official duties for which a school board may hold them
accountable as reflective of the considered wisdom of state legislatures.
Hence, these should be the official duties for which a school board may
retaliate even when a te-a cher speaks about them properly. Of course,
retaliation will not accomplish the discharge of the statutorily or
contractually protected teachers.
But probatio.n ary teachers and
administrators without such protections .c an be discharged under
Garcetti within this framework. A school board attempting to go
beyond this framework exceeds its license under Garcetti and treads on
teachers' speech rights as citizens. Thus, assuming that Garcetti should
even be imposed on teachers, its power should be limited by narrow job
descriptions.

30J. A case of hair-splitting that did not involve any real "official duties, ofteachers is BrammerHoefler v. Twin Peaks Charter Academy, 492 F.3d 1192 (I Oth Cir. 2007); see also Dillon v. Twin Peaks
Charter Acad., 241 F. App~x 490 (1Oth Cir. 2007). In Brammer-Boelter, the principal of a charter
school retaliated against several teachers who met off-site to discuss c,o ncems about the operation and
management of the school. Brammer-Hoelter, 492 F.3d at 1198-1201. According to the court,
unprotected official-duty speech included discussions about student discipline, curriculum, pedagogy,
and equipment. /d. at 1204. Unofficial duty speech included teacher resignations, the Academy's
teacher communication policy, staffing, salaries and bonuses, school board criticism, the principal's
leadership failures, parent complaints, the renewal of the Academy's charter, and the pending school
board elections. /d. at 1204-05. However, of these, the only matters of -public concern were the
Academy's communication policy, the principal's prior restraint of teacher speech, the charter renewal
and the school board elections. /d. at 1206. This parsing of "official duties" and "matters of public
concern" makes little sense; especially in light of the fact that many of these off-site meetings included
participation by parents and other members. of the public. /d. at 1199.
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Garcetti is also the wrong vehicle for retaliating against a teacher for
305
classroom speech.
Classically considered a matter of a teacher's
prerogative_, efforts have been made to clothe the classroom speech of
public school teachers clearly an official duty with a First
306
Amendment academic freedom.
As the Court has stated,
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic
freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely
to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special
concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that
cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. ''The vigilant
protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in
the community of American schools." The classroom is peculiarly
the "marketplace of ideas." The Nation's future depends up.on
leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of
ideas which discovers truth "out of a multitude of tongues, [rather]
307
than through any kind of authoritative selection.,;

Some learned analyses suggest that the instructional portion of a
teacher's job has separate considerations under the First Amendment as
academic freedom, apart from the employment speech line of cases
08
represented by Pickering, Connick, and now Garcetti.JHowever, the courts that have applied Garcettt to uphold retaliation
decisions in classroom speech engage in an analysis reminiscent of
309
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.
Hazelwood offered a
principle of limited tolerance for student-initiated speech in the context

304. "lt is the supreme art of the teacher to awaken joy in creative expression and knowledge.''
This quotation bas been attributed to Albert Einstein. See THE COLUMBIA WORLD OF QUOTATIONS
(Robert Andrew et al. eds., 1996), available at http://www.bartleby.com/66/85/18585.html.
305. Note also that the statutory grounds for disciplining teac.hers and the cases arising therefrom
rarely, if ever, mention classroom speech as a grounds for discipline. See, e.g., CAMBRON-MCCABE,
MCCARTHY & THOMAS, supra note 293, at 412~23.
306. See, e.g., Karen C. Daly, Balancing Act: Teachers' Classroom Speech and the First
Amendment, 30 J.L. & Eouc. 1, 39-51 (200 I); see also J. Peter Byme, Academic Freedom: A "Special
Concern ofthe First Amendment," 99 YALE L.J. 251 (1989) (academic freedom in higher education); R.
George Wright, The Emergence of First Amendment Academic Freedom, 85 NEB. L. REv. 793 (2007)
(academic freedom in higher education). See generally Diane. Heckman, Commentary, The First
Amendment and Academia: Twenty Years of Examining Matters of Public Concern, 188 Eouc. L. REP.
585, 586-89 (2004); W. Stuart Stuller, High School Academic Freedom: The Evolution ofa Fish Out of
Water; 77 NEB. L. REV. 301 (1998).
307. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (alteration in original) (citation
omitted) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker; 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960); United Slates v. Associated Press, 52 F.
Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
308. See; e.g., Daly, supra note 306, at 7-11; Wright, supra note 306, at 797-98.
309. 484 u.s. 260 (1988).
'
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of a student newspaper. The school could regulate that speech because
it was school-sponsored and could "fairly be characterized as part of the
310
school curriculum."
At least one court now applies that same
reasoning to teacher's classroom speech: A school district hires a teacher
to convey school-sponsored speech, and as a consequence, the school
district is not required to pay for a commodity it did not hire if the
311
teacher strays from the "party" line.
This type of analysis is a poor substitute for protection of teachers'
academic freedom because it is inexact and it fits the listeners the
312
teacher's audience not the speaker.
In addition, Hazelwood at least
recognizes some speech is acceptable and worthy of protection whereas
Garcetti makes the content irrelevant: all that is critical to the analysis is
the employee-employer relationship. Consequently, there now appears
to be a small and unfortunate trend to quash all independent teaching
speech the real skill for which teachers are hired for uniformity in
orthodoxy, contrary to that asserted by the Court in Epperson v.
Arkansas:
•

The States are most assuredly free "to choose their own
curriculums for their own schools." A State is entirely free, for
example, to decide that the only foreign language to be taught in its
public school system shall be Spanish. But would a State be
constitutionally free to punish a teacher for letting his students
know that other languages are also spoken in the world? I think
not.
It is one thing for a State to detertnine that "the subject of
higher mathematics, or astronomy, or biology" shall or shall not be
included in its public school curriculum. It is quite another thing
for a State to make it a[n] ... offense for a public school teacher so
much as to mention the very existence of an entire system of
respected human thought. That kind of . . . law, I think, would
clearly impinge upon the guarantees of free conununication

310. /d. at 271. The Supreme Court stated:
They cannot be punished merely for expressing their personal views on the school
premises whether "in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the
authorized hours" unless school authorities have reason to believe that such expression
will "substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of
other students."

/d. at 266 (citation omitted) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509,
512-13 (1969)).
311. Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 479 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
128 S. Ct. 160 (2007).
312. See Daly, supra note 306, at 14.
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Surely, Garcetti was not designed to make teachers puppets of school
boards and their whims. When all the discretion is taken out of the
teaching obligation, what is there left to do?
This Article is not designed to forge new ground in the matter of
academic freedom; it is instead designed to address Garcetti's impact on
teachers. As noted in the analysis, many cases applying Garcetti to
school district retaliation against teachers really do not involve
curricular disputes~ Rather, they were instances of school administrators
who punished teachers when parents got upset over perceived political
statements and who lashed out before the parents went to the s-c hool
board, who would then punish the school administrators as a form of
defensive retaliation. They were academic freedom issues, but unrelated
314
to curriculum.
To the extent that courts continue to frame academic freedom cases as
curricular issues, there is probably little to fear that teachers' academic
freedom will be threatened often by Garcetti. B_e cause the reality is that
school boards really have-no hand in curriculum, are rarely qualified to
control curriculum, and, as discussed below, probably do not want that
obligation.
Of all the members of the educational hierarchy, school boards are the
entity least able to contribute substantively to curriculum formation.
The members are electe.d officials who usually run on one-issue
platforms or who are more interested in the fiscal management of the
governmental entity. As a consequence, they usually have no training,
background, or experienc-e in education and education policy. Although
their advocacy groups may have some expertise in the area, school board
members do not serve life~time tenures, and the members filter in and
out of the political process. Continuity in the teaching process is
necessary, and school boards_do not and cannot fulfill that role.
Instead, for curriculum purposes, school boards are governed by what
their state education departments set out, for any particular grade or for
315
any particular discipline, as the curricular goals.
The implementation
of those goals is outside the expertise of the school boards so they
delegate academic matters like curriculum to those better equipped to

313. 393 U.S. 97, 115-16 (1968) (Stewart; J., concuning in the result).
314. Such fear of retaliation is the natural consequence of "elected school boards [that] are
tempted to support majority positions about religious or patriotic subjects." Mayer, 414 F.3d at 479.
315. Seet e.g., MICHAEL IMBER& TYLL VAN GEEL, EDUCATION LAW 62·67 (3d ed. 2004). These
days, the federal government, through the No Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-7941 (2000 &
Supp. V 2005), is playing a greater role in the states' prerogative to control their curricular choices and
academic programs.
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handle them. And the individuals who are better equipped to formulate
curricular affairs and the educational function of the institution .are the
education professionals: teachers and school administrators. It is to
them that school boards delegate the responsibility for curriculum and
all things associated with curriculum, such as textbook selection,
curriculum guides, and often grading policies. If the school district is
large enough, it may have curriculum professionals on administrative
staff to assure compliance with state models and to oversee the general
academic agenda. In other districts, teachers and administrators (and
perhaps parents) serve on committees to formulate academic policy and
adopt textbooks. In some jurisdictions, curricular programming and
academic programming are, at the very least, mandatory subjects of
labor discussion with the teachers, if not mandatory subjects of
bargaining. Thus, only the rare state gives the school board full power
over the academic program. As a consequence of this delegation of
academic programming and derogation of control, only the unique
school board can prove it has such control over the curriculum that its
teachers and administrators have no academic freedom. As a practical
matter, the vast ·majority of school boards afford academic freedom to
their teachers and administrators over curricular and academic
programming as both a legal and as a practical matter, regardless of
what the courts decide. And it would be the rare school board that
316
would wish to do it all itself.
Confining teachers' classroom speech to only specified curricular
matters, without the ability to step outside the lines, defeats the purpose
of a democratic education that puts little value on uniformity and
orthodoxy. Indeed, students are unimpressed by teachers confined by
strictures imposed on academic planning and curricular materials:

316. School boards are also ill-equipped to deal with curricular issues because they are a
majoritarian representative body:
[W]ithin our .constitutional scheme, the representative nature of school boards may
actually militate against allowing them unrestricted control over curricular dec.isions.
Elected officials likely are highly responsive to the majority that voted for them. Since
the majority controls the election, we need not otherwise protect dominant viewpoints of
established groups. Similarly~ electoral accountability ensures that those ·who disagree
with these dominant views rarely hold pubJic office. This political process, however,
scantily protects the community's ideological minorities. These disadvantaged outsiders,
lacking political influence, most need the first amendment to protect them from the
tyranny and transient passions ofthe majority.
Stanley Ingber, Socialization, Indoctrination, or the ltPa/1 of Orthodoxy": Value Training in the Public
Schools, 1987 U. ILL. L. REv. 15, 38. For a contrary vie_w: "[I]f indoctrination is likely, the. power
should be reposed in someone the people can vote out of office, rather than tenured teachers." Mayer,
474 F.3d at 479-80.
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Students always test their teachers, and teachers too seldom pass those
tests. What they are looking for in their teachers are a few basic
qualities honesty, integrity, concern. They generally dislike teachers
who merely parrot what their own superiors, or their own lesson plans,
tell them to say. They respond to the local, not to the imperial. They
respond to the individual, not to the institution. They respond to the act
of one man or woman stepping away from the protection of the school
system and the textbook, from the collusion of adults and authorities, and
taking risks based on faith in individual students. That act of faith, the
317
faith of one teacher in one student, is the center of it all.

As a consequence, academic freedom is willingly ceded to public school
teachers by their school boards, a cession with which courts should be
loathe to interfere, despite Garcetti.
IV. BE CAREFUL WHArYouWISHFOR

A..

Employee Morale

Now that public employers can punish or even dismiss public
employees for communicating to and about their students in essence,
for doing their jobs Garcetti will likely accomplish that which public
employers feared would happen if public employees were allowed to
speak out under the First Amendment: it will likely "lower morale,
disrupt the work force, or otherwise undermine the mission of the
318
office."
The immediate effect of Garcetti and the increasing number
of teacher retaliation cases being decided in its wake will likely render
the labor-management relations in the workplace even m.ore contentious.
With the definition of "official duties" unclear at best, and an
unattainable moving target at worst, teachers and administrators will not
know how to protect themselves from the "fanciful" fears of their
employer.
And the tension is not just reserved for school boards and their
employees. It also encourages a widening rift between administrators
and teachers. It will further "the parking lot syndrome," where the
administration talks at faculty meetings while the faculty talks in the
319
parking lot afterward.
Improvements in and critiques of academic and
3-17. PETER S. TEMES, AGAINST SCHOOL REFORM (AND IN PRAISE OF GREAT TEACHING):
GETIING BEYOND ENDLESS TESTING! REGIMENTATION, AND REFORM IN OUR SCHOOLS 160 (2002).
318. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 393 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring) (remarking that
public employers' fears were "fanciful'1}.
319. ROLAND S. BARTH, IMPROVING SCHOOLS FROM WITHIN: TEACHERS, PARENTS AND
PRINCIPALS CAN MAKE THE DIFFERENCE 20 (1990).
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other schoolhouse matters will be suspended for fear that the teachers'
320
speech will not comport with an administrators' orthodoxy.
And
teachers' classroom instruction will be stunted by the fear that they will
be disciplined even discharged based on their speech, which only
could be protected by some irrational and unknowable standard.
Independent thought will be abandoned for concern of potential job loss.
Teachers and administrators will become even greater adversaries than
321
before. Gone are the days when
[a]ll the habits of mind and work that go into democratic
institutional life [are] practiced in our schools until they truly
become habits so deeply a part of us that in times of stress we fall
back on them rather than abandon them in search of a great leader
or father figure, or retreat into the private isolation of our private
interests, the unfettered marketplace where one need not worry
322
about the repercussions of one's individual decisions.
In their place are the days of fear and anxiety: Teachers and school
administrators have specific job skills, and there is rarely more than one
educational employer in town. Therefore, losing a teaching or
323
administrative job often means leaving the community.
The only saving grace for teachers but usually not for
administrators may be an increased union pres_ence to assure that
retaliatory acts are ineffective under the state tenure and collective

320. Unfortunately, the situation may s_imply reflect the status quo as some administrative
orthodoxy does not have much respect for teachers anyway:
[T]eaching is largely a, feminized occupation. It therefore behaves that way in some
situations.
Teachers are highly sensitive about status differentials. They are highly resistant to
change~ They are suspicious of authority. They are politically conservative. They are
not an easy group to lead, govern, congeal, motivate, or cajole. They are, however, easily
insulted, provoked, intimidated, or angered. Great teachers are always prima donnas with
their principals and sometimes with their students.
It should be remembered that administrators deal with tea~hers as adults. However,
teachers are most used to dealing with students. They often have a terrible time dealing
with other adults and especially with persons in authority. Some teachers are just awful
adults.
JOHN A. BLACK & FENWICK W. ENGLISH, WHAT THEY DON'T TELL YOU IN SCHOOLS OF EDUCATION
ABOUT SCHOOL ADMINISTRATJON 75 (1986) (footnote omitted). UnfortunateJy, administrators have

their own personal baggage. See, e.g., Donal M. Sacken, Sad Stories of the Death of Kings: Demotions
and Dismissals ofAdministrators, 25 J .L. & Eouc. 419 ( 1996).
321. See BARTH, supra note 319, at 19-22.
322. DEBORAH MEIER, IN SCHOOLS WE TRUST: CREATING COMMUNITIES OF LEARNING IN AN
ERA OF TESTING AND STANDARDIZATION 177 (2002).
323. In addition, losing a teaching job may well preclude teaching ever after because of the stigma
attached. See generally Jay Worona & Cheryl Randall, Defamation and Stigma Claims by Terminated
Employees, in TERMINATION OF SCHOOL EMPLOYEES: LEGAL ISSUES & TECHNIQUES 13-1 ( 1997).
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bargaining acts and under the pertinent coJlective bargaining agreements
324
So far, the vast
that govern the discipline and discharge of teachers.
majority of teacher cases involved teachers with little experience,
usually the least protected and most vulnerable under the statutes.
Indeed, in these and administrator cases, the First Amendment may well
have been invoked because of the absence of other statutory or

contractual protections. However, the new "orthodoxy" of school
325
326
boards
for the "efficiency of the educational system"
may impel
school boards to flex their new-found power over mote experienced
teachers. Even if they do not, the "pall" may poison the employment
relationship at the least, and at the worst, interfere with the ''efficiency
of the educational system."

B.

Schools as a Matter of Public Concern

The perspective on this new power given by the Court to school
boards may evoke different public reactions. One reaction at the
forefront likely will be this power's potential to squelch public oversight
of the educational institution. If the foxes are guarding the henhouse
and the hens cannot give warning of legitimate problems, then the public
trust in the institution will justifiably be eroded even further. On such
issues, those with eroded trust would run a school board election
campaign opposing sitting members. Their election issues would b·e
twofold: the school board is not responsive to the taxpayers, and the
327
school board is hiding something.
This reaction would rest on this premise: Much of what educators do
in public schools is a matter of public concern. Educators know better
than the school board members what is going on in the schools day to
324. fiSCHER, SCHIMMEL & STELLMAN, supra note 302, at 41.
325. See Brief of Amicus Curiae National School Hoards Association in Support of Petitioners,
Garcetti v. Ceballos; 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (No. 04-473), 2005 WL 1284578. See generally Thomas E.
Wheeler, II, Striking a Faustian Bargain: The Boundaries of Public Employee Free Speech Rights, REs
GESTAE, Sept. 2006, at 13. Mr. Wheeler was one of counsel on the NSBA amicus brief in support of the
public employer.
326. Brief of Amicus Curiae National Schoo1 Boards Association in Support of Petitioners, supra
note 325, at 1.
327. Although one would hope school board elections would take the high road and not engage in
bashing the incumbents, the unfortunate fact is that candidates must distinguish themselves from the
incumbents. Showing that the current board members do not feel they can be held accountable to the
public will resonate with voters. See, e.g., Associated Press, Dover Voters Oust Intelligent Design
Supporters, MSNBC ~COM, Nov. 9, 2005, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9973228; MSNBC
Staff and N.ews Service Reports, Evolution's Foes Lose Ground in Kansas, MSNBC.COM, Aug. 2, 2006,
http://www.msnbc~msn.com/id/14137751; Jessica Blanchard, Groups Prepare for School Board
Election, SEATILE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 18, 2007, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/
locall316380_appleseed 19 .html.
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day. In addition, educators are often the sole sources for infonnation

that might not otherwise be a matter of public knowledge. But for their
jobs, they would not have this information. The best resources for
speech about government accountability on the day-to-day operations of
school districts, therefore, are those now at risk of being discharged
under Garcetti.
The impetus for this perspective is that teachers are a special type of
citizen. In other words, a teacher's chosen profession is at all times a
matter of public concern, and when teachers are at their places of
employment, they remain citizens. The unique nature of this public
employment makes teachers' personas inseparable from their citizen
personas,. This may be for no other reason than their self-imposed sense
of personal ethics. It may also be the practical continuity that must carry
them through any number of school board members who are not
education professionals. But it also arises because of the nature of the
institution, its structure, and its role in society.
Numerous philosophers have enunciated their constructs of education
328
For instance, Plato's notion of
and how teaching can implement it.
education posited that the
teacher's task is to effect a kind-of intellectual conversion experience in
the learner that redirects the person from the sensory world of
appearanc_es, images, and opinions to the realm of ideas. Whereas
knowing can occur only in the mind of the person, the teacher creates the
proper environment and asks the questions that will stimulate the learning
329
process.

In a more contemporary vein, John Dewey stated that the ''value of
school education is the extent in which it creates a desire for continued
330
growth and supplies means for making the desire effective in fact.''
He further opined,
Without . . . formal education, it is not possible to transmit all the
resources and achievements of a complex society. It also opens a way to
a kind of experience which would not be accessible to the young, if they
were left to pick up their training in informal association with others,
331
since books and the symbols ofknowledge are mastered.

In addition, upon that institution are placed the burdens of universal

328. See generally GERALD L. 0UTEK, HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
EDUCATION: A BIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 1997).
329. /d. at 22.

OF

330. JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCMCY AND EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF
EDUCATION 53 (1st Free Press Paperback ed., The Free Pre-ss 1966) ( 1916).

33L /d. at 8.
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education and the instruction of the citizenry. As the Court stated half a
century ago,
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and
the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our
recognition of the importance of education to our democratic
society. It is required in the perforn1ance of our most basic public
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very
foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument
in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later
professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
332
opportunity of an education.
Thus, public schools are the institution to which the
devotion of democracy . . . is a familiar fact. The superficial
explanation is that a government resting upon popular suffrage
cannot be successful unless those who elect and who obey their
governors are educated. . . . But there is a deeper explanation. A
democracy is more than a fon11 of government; it is primarilY- a
333
mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience.
To the extent a democratic society continues to broaden its
participation in govennnent and interaction among its members, the
more it is dependent upon that government's "deliberate effort to sustain
and extend" the community of interests and to prepare its constituent
334
members to actively participate and adapt.
Thus are schools a civic
enterprise in which all citizens have an interest, unlike the particular
workings of the county highway department, the state bureau of motor
vehicles, or the Federal Trade Commission. Indeed, most citizens insist
on taking an interest in and having a hand at participating in this
institutional enterprise. Consequently, most of what happens in schools
is considered a matter of public concern.
Muzzling teachers from speaking out about this institution smacks of
an authoritarianism that is contrary to everything the institution stands
for. Furthermore, the ordinary citizen would be puzzled to hear that
teachers were fired for doing their jobs, and more so to hear that teachers
are fired for speaking out on matters that concern the public, not just on
teaching obligations but on matters that affect the administration of a

332. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
333. DEWEY, supra note 330, at 87.
334. /d. at 87-88.
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335

school district and the management of taxpayer funds.
But most of all, many citizens are affected by public schools and
interested in how they are run as a participatory governmental
enterprise, one that is often open to the public for a very public
enterprise. This is particularly so simply because school boards are
elected. As the Court, in its wisdom, pointed out in Pickering, speaking
out on matters of public concern in schools infortns the "free and open
336
debate ... vital to inforn1ed decision-making by the electorate."
A
school board that uses Garcetti to stifle that debate runs significant risk
of public and political backlash in this era of increasing accountability.
A school board that squelches that type of speech runs the justifiable risk
337
of adverse publicity
and electioneering that accuses it of hiding
something from the public.

C.

Airing the Dirty Laundry

Adverse publicity is clearly one way for teachers to feel they are
fulfilling their professional responsibilities yet armor themselves from
retaliation. They may go public with disclosures through the media or
by speaking out at public school board meetings, especially when the
press is there. Going to the local media clearly insulated the teachers
from retaliation in both Pickering and Mt. Healthy City School District
Board of Education v. Doyle. Marvin Pickering wrote a letter to the
38
editor of the local newspaper' while Fred Doyle telephoned a

335. This is just one reason why Pickering is and should remain the model for teacher speech.
Pickering's appositive, "teacher, as a citizen," did not identify two creatures teacher or citizen but
one: teacher= citizen. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). As such, teachers were
encouraged by the Pickering Court to use the infonnation to which they are privy qua teachers for
communicating public concerns. "Teachers are, as a class, the members of the community most likely
to have info• 1ned and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to the operation of the schools should be
spent. Accordingly, it is essential that they be able to speak out freely on such questions without fear of
retaliatory dismissal." /d. at 572.
336. /d. at 571-72. In a similar situation, the Court has stated:
Our Constitution does not pennit the official suppression of ideas. Thus whether
petitioners' removal of books from their school libraries denied respondents their First
Amendment rights depends· upon the· ·motivation· ·behind· petitioners' -actions. If
petitioners intended by their removal decision to deny respondents access to ideas with
which petitioners disagreed, and if this intent was the decisive factor in petitioners'
decision, then petitioners have exercised their discretion in violation of the Constitution.
Bd. ofEduc. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,871 (1982) (footnote omitted).
337. Parents Expose Corrupt School Board (Full Disclosure Network Mar. 25, 2006),
http://www.fulldisclosure.net/flash/452-3_CUSD_preview.php; Pat Kossan, School Districts on Notice,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Dec. 6, 2005, available at http://www.aznews.us/school_districts_on_notice.htm.
338. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 575-78 (appendix to opinion of the court).

2008]

CITIZEN TEACHER

1335

339

Cincinnati radio station.
In addition, several post-Garcetti cases
suggest that, had the "offending" teacher gone public first, the school
district would have been in violation of the First Amendment for
retaliating.
For instance, of all Elihu McMahon's numerous
communications about alleged school district problems, only three were
deemed worthy of protection, including a letter to the New York
340
Times.
At the very least, speaking to the media is rarely if ever:within a teacher's "official" duties.
Thus, case law supports the notion that teachers should make their
concerns public rather than approach their administrators if they believe
that matters of public concern in the school district are being
inadequately addressed by the school administration or the school
341
board.
If the public has a right to know perhaps a need to know of
mismanagement problems, then teachers must comply with that need
and circumvent the ordinary lines of communication. And there is not
much that a school board can do in response as prior restraint of teacher
342
speech is prohibited.
Nor can a school board assert that a teacher
343
must go through "proper channels" on matters of public concem.
So
339. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.274, 282 (1977).
340. McMahon v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., No. CV-01-6205, 2006 WL 3680624, at *8 (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 12, 2006); see also Rush v. Perryman, No. 1:07CVOOOO 1, 2007 WL 2091745 (E.D. Ark. July 17,
2007) (finding that a college president's speech to the press was protected whereas his speech to a state
legislative committee was not if undertaken pursuant to his official duties). Security specialist Robert B.
Posey would have made out a case for retaliation if he had "communicate[d] his concerns regarding
school security and safety issues to the 'newspapers or [his] legislators."' Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille
Sch. Dist. No. 84, No. CVOS-272, 2007 WL 420256, at •s (D. Idaho Feb. 2, 2007) (second alteration in
original). And Gail Cole's complaints about bus discipline might have been better protected if they had
been "made ... in an attempt to infonn the public or to further public discourse." Cole v. Anne Arundel
County Bd. of Educ., No. CCB-05-1579, 2006 WL 3626888, at *7 (D. Md. Nov. 30, 2006); see also
Bailey v. Dep't of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 451 F.3d 514, 519 (8th Cir. 2006) (suggesting, in
dicta, that a state department of education employee would have made a. better case for First
Amendment protection if his concerns had been "made public"). Such disclosures, of course, must be
constrained by the Family Educational Rights & Privacy Act and state legislation that protects public
employee privacy rights.
341. See also Krystal LoPilato, Recent Case, Garcetti v. Ceballos: Public Employees Lose First
Amendment Protection for Speech Within Their Job Duties, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 53 7, 543
(2006).
342. See City of Madison, Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 429
U.S. 167, 175 ( 1976). "Whatever its duties as an employer, when the board sits in public meetings to
conduct public business and hear the views of citizens, it may not be required to discriminate between
speakers on the basis of their employment .... " /d. at 176 (citing Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,
96 (1972)).
343. See Knapp v. Whitaker, 757 F.2d 827, 843 (7th Cir. 1985). The Seventh Circuit has
determined a school board cannot discipline a teacher who foregoes the chain of command to speak
directly to the board on matters of public concern when such communication did not disrupt the
districfs provision of education services. /d. In like manner, a Texas federal district court stated, "the
interest of the [school district] to have these matters [of public concern] channeled through a grievance
procedure does not justify the tennination of [the teacher's] teaching contract under these
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school boards face the prospect of having their dirty laundry aired in
public with ·little recourse for retaliation unless the speech results in a
disruption of educational services, a rather hard standard to meet when
the matters are weighty issues ofpublic concern.
Consequently, a more considered approach to the problem would be
for school boards to fulfill their public role and act less like an employer
and more like an institution in these matters. Such role would go back
to the Pickering-Connick analysis and respect teachers' First
344
A cooperative relationship would
Amendment rights to speak.
ultimately be more beneficial than an adversarial one, especially when
there is a "common" enemy out there: the federal government and the
new accountability measures.
D.

Accountability

One of the cornerstones of the various education "reform" movements
is to make teachers more accountable for their classroom teaching.
Indeed, much of the premier legislation designed to achieve these
345
reforms No Child Left Behind (NCLB)
is dependent upon
346
measuring school districts' accountability for student achievement.
Although increasingly the one common enemy of school boards,
347
administrators, and teachers, accountability specifically puts teachers
348
under the gun: they can be rewarded for good scotes and they can be
disciplined for bad scores be-cause, even if they are the chief delivery
circumstances.'' Lusk v. Estes, 361 F. Supp. 653, 662 (N.D. Tex. 1973). Even more blunt was the
pronouncement from a federal district court in Oregon: "The channels rules, which require advance
notice to the sup,erintendent of any direct message to the, board, are an impennissible prior restraint."
Anderson v. Cent. PointSch. Dist. No.6, 554 F. Supp. 600~ 608 (D. Ore. 1982), affd, 746 F.2d 505 (9th
Cir. 1984) (citing Rosen v. Port of Portland, 641 F.2d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 1981)). Most recently, a
2006 federal district court decision from New York detennined that a school district failed to articulate
any government interests in support of its broad "communication protocol, that required teachers to
follow a chain of command before discussing school matters with outside sources. Price v. Saugerties
Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 105CV0465, 2006 WL 314458 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2006).
344. See, e.g., Richard S. Vacca, Teacher First Amendment Speech 2006: Policy Implications,
CEPI Eouc. L. NEWSL. (Commonwealth Educ. Policy lost., Richmond, Va.), Jan .. 2006, available at
http://www.cepi. vcu.edu/newsletter/2005-2006/2006_Jan_Teacher_First_Amendment.html .
.345. 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-7941 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
346. See, e.g., Wendy 'Beetlestone & Owen F. Lipsett, No Child Left Behind·'s Accountability and
Access Provisions: An Inherent Tension Within Supplemental Educational Services Programs, 216
Eouc. L. REP. 807 (2007); WilliamS. Koski, Achieving HAdequacy'' in the Classroom, 27 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 13 (2007); Gershon M. Ratner, Why the No Child Left Behind Act Needs to Be Restructured
to Accomplish Its Goals and How to Do It, 9 UDC/DCSL L. REV. I (2007).
347. See~ e.g., Philip T.K. Daniel, No Child Left Behind: The Balm of Gilead Has Arrived in
American Education, 206 Eouc~ L. REP. 791 (2006).
348. Leah A. Rinfret, No Child Left Behind for the Teachers Left Behind: Returning Education to
the Educators, 35 CAP. U. L. REv. 281 (2006).
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system of instruction, they remain mere public employees.
But
Garcetti's progeny may have put paid to the notion that teachers can be
held accountable for their teaching anymore if school boards are allowed
to retaliate against teachers for classroom speech.
If one follows through with the notions set forth in the Seventh
Circuit's reasoning in Mayer v. Monroe County Community School
350
Corp.
and in the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Boring v. Buncombe
351
County Board of Education,
rightly or wrongly decided, school
boards are the sole deciders and therefore the sole defenders of
curriculum now. Teachers in the public schools in at least the Fourth
and Seventh Circuits no longer have any academic freedom to teach.
Rather, teachers' curriculum delivery has become a function of
employment not a function of education. Instead, the teachers are now
just government speakers, and the rigor required of the curriculum lies
entirely with the school board. As a consequence, teachers are no longer
delegated the professional responsibilities they once held to "have at
least some input into the school curriculum and . . . to exercise their
professional discretion in translating that curriculum into classroom
352
lessons."
NCLB and decisions like those in Mayer and Boring tip the
balance of professional power and teaching discretion into the hands of
those least equipped to handle it but nevertheless eager to wield control
353
over the modus of instruction.
With such direct control over the
instructional function, teachers are reduced to the puppets of school
boards. Without the discretion to use their professional judgment,
teachers are reduced to ministerial functionaries with no other academic
function than to parrot the school board liturgy.
Under those circumstances, there seems no foothold for holding
teachers accountable for results. If teachers deliver the curriculum they
are given by their employers, then they must be rewarded for doing their
jobs, not punished if the appropriate results are not achieved. Because
teachers will no longer have any control or discretion on student
achievement, school boards cannot make them accountable for the
results. Consequently, teachers in at least the Fourth and Seventh
Circuits seem to have escaped the accountability hammer because,
without academic freedom, they have no discretion with which to be
held accountable. Only the school boards can be held accountable when

349. Daly, supra note 306, at 45 (positing that, in a rigidly hierarchical school district, teachers are
unfairly made accountable for the curricular and educational decisions made by the school board).
350. 474 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 160 (2007).
351. 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998).
352. Daly, supra note 306, at 48-49.
353. /d. at 49.
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354

academic freedom is absent.
·
In conjunction with this new-found power of the school boards,
however, is the courts' increased power to second-guess curricular
decisions and the delivery of instruction. Right now, one of the few
judicial bulwarks from claims of educational malpractice that school
boards have enjoyed is that, among other things, there is no readily
articulated standard of care for teaching:
Unlike the activity of the highway or the marketplace, classroom
methodology affords no readily acceptable standards of care, or
cause, or injury. The science of pedagogy itself is fraught with
different and conflicting theories .o f how or what a child should be
taught, and any layman might and commonly does have his
own emphatic views on the subject. The "injury" claimed here is
plaintiffs inability to read and write. Substantial professional
authority attests that the achievement of literacy in the schools, or
its failure, are [sic] influenced by a host of factors which affect the
pupil subjectively, from outside the formal teaching process, and
beyond the control of its ministers. They may be physical,
neurological, emotional, cultural, environmental; the~ may be
3 5
present but not perceived, recognized but not identified.
Now that the courts have removed pedagogy from the equation and
teachers are simply the mouthpieces for whatever the school board
directs them to say, the policies behind dismissing educational
malpractice cases out of hand have much less substance and support.
The loss of academic freedom renders the failure of the academic
356
function a matter of mere negligence, easily decided 'by the courts.
354~

To take advantage of this loss of academic freedom, school boards can now wrest curriculum
construction from the professional educators and do it all themselves. On the one hand, any delegation
of those duties would cloak the teachers and administrators with ipso facto academic freedom and would
act as a waiver or estoppel of a school board's arguments against academic freedom. On the other hand,
such derogation of academic freedom may increase court interfere.nce in the affairs of school districts.
To the extent that instructional choices become ministerial rather than discretionary (and therefore
outside the expertise of courts), then courts will begin to believe themselves as well equipped to make
instructional decisions as school boards. To the extent that the Court has not embraced fully embraced
the school-board delegation model, the onus may well be on school boards rather than teachers:
School boards are generally quite content to delegate authority to teachers, for reasons of
managerial efficiency and recognition of teachers' superior professional. expertise. The
courts are required to intervene and enforce this division of labor only in rare cases where
the structure breaks down. Various lower courts have done so; however, despite
supportive language, the Supreme Court has never explicit1y endorsed the delegation
model.
/d. at 47-48 (footnotes omitted).
355. Peter W. v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860--61 (Ct. App. 1976), quoted in
Hunterv. Bd. ofEduc., 439 A.2d 582, 584 (Md. 1982).
356. See, e.g., Hyman v. Greent 403 N.W.2d 597 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); Webber v. Yeo, 383
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An additional effect of removing academic freedom from public
school teachers is the legal characterization of the teaching function
itself. The school boards within the jurisdictions of the Seventh and
Fourth Circuits now have on their hands teaching employees with only
ministerial functions. As any public employer should know, ministerial
functions are usually not immune from tort liability because the
qualified privilege from attack often only exists when a public employee
357
is acting in a discretionary capacity.
Indeed, state tort claims acts
often except only discretionary but not ministerial acts from tort
358
liability.
Thus, the school boards have laid themselves open to
"permitting damages suits [that] can entail substantial social costs,
including the risk that fear of personal monetary liability and harassing
359
litigation will unduly inhibit [them] in the discharge of their duties."
Heaven forbid that educational malpractice cases ever gain traction.
However, the school boards are flirting with disaster in denying to their
most qualified employees the liberty to exercise their educational
function. With the increased attention to accountability and the
reduction of student learning and teacher instruction to a numbers game,
the current education reform measures have sowed fertile ground for
360
easily provable acts of negligence.
Indeed, the strictures of NCLB
have made the failure to achieve those numbers virtually a matter of
negligence per se. In removing the cushion of the discretionary function
of academic freedom, the school boards are going to find themselves
answerable not just to the federal government and their state
departments of education, but also to their student constituents. Surely
that is not what school boards intended in litigating to appeal those
academic freedom cases that were essentially political controversies
easily mediated with the parents and teachers. Retaliation clearly has its
costs.
Perhaps the most effective remedy to that problem is to create a
written policy of the school board's fundamental belief in academic
freedom, within the Pickering limits. Indeed, collective bargaining
agreements containing academic freedom language would reinstate the
equilibrium between the school board's fiscal tasks and teachers'
361
instructional tasks.
One such comprehensive provision states:
N.W.2d 230 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
357. See, e.g. , Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987).
358. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN, EDUCATION LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE: CASES AND
MATERIALS 670-71 (2005).
359. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 638 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982)).
360. See Todd A. DeMitchell & Terri A. DeMitchell, Statutes and Standards: Has the Door to
Educational Malpractice Been Opened?, 2003 BYU Eouc. & L.J. 485.
361. See, e.g., Cary v. Bd. of Educ., 598 F.2d 535, 538 (lOth Cir. 1979) (limited academic
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Academic Freedom
(1) It is mutually recognized that freedom carries with it responsibility;
academic freedom also carries with it academic responsibility which is
deterrnined by the basic ideals; goals, and institutions of the local
community. Discussion and analysis of controversial issues should be
conducted within the framework of the fundamental values of the
community as they are expressed in the educational philosophy and
objectives of the Board.
(2) Within the preceding frame of reference and as it pertains to the
course to which a teacher is assigned, academic freedom in the Fort
Wayne Community Schools is defined as:
(a) The right to teach and learn about controversial issues which have
economic, political, scientific, or social significance.
(b) The right to use materials which are relevant to the levels of ability
and maturity of the students and to the purposes of the school system.
(c) The right to maintain a classroom environment which is conducive to
the free exchange and examination of ideas which have economic,
political, scientific; or social significance.
(d) The right of teachers to participate fully in the public affairs of the
community.
(e) The right of students to hold divergent ideas as long as the expression
of their dissent is done within the guidelines of debate and discussion
which are generally accepted by teachers in a normal classroom
environment.
(f) The right of teachers to free expression of conscience as private
citizens with the correlative_responsibility of a professional presentation
of balanced views relating to controversial issues as they are studied in
362
the classroom.
.

The converse of such agreement even if only in principle is the pall
of orthodoxy decried by the Court and its inherent threat to the
institution:
Teachers, if forced to act as a mouth-piece for the school board, are the
most efficient tools of indoctrination imaginable. A system that permits
teachers to act as opposing voices within curricular parameters
established by a popularly elected school board minimizes the potential of
363
either actor to distort their educational function into brainwashing.

freedom provision in collective bargaining agreement).
362. 2004 07 Master Contract Between the Board of School Trustees of Fort Wayne Community
Schools and Fort Wayne Education Association, Inc. 30 (on file with author).
363. Daly, supra note 306; at 46.
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CONCLUSION

The history of First Amendment protection for public employees is
dependent upon the history of First Amendment protections for teachers.
For good or ill, teachers have found themselves as the forward unit in
setting out the stakes governing the free speech relationship between the
public employer and the public employee. Perhaps teachers' unique
characteristics make their speech the natural target for employment
retaliation they are, after all, hired for their communication skills.
However, perhaps teachers' unique characteristics also make Garcetti
ill-suited for any long-term application.
Teachers have so many obligations to their students, their schools,
their administrators and their colleagues that are peripheral to the actual
instruction that they have a hard time enunciating what is not
364
professional speech in any particular teaching assignment.
Professionalism on the job for teachers digs more deeply and sweeps
more broadly than any enumeration of specific duties to a special,
expansive citizenship responsibility. Teachers are considered to be the
schools they do not just do a job; rather, they are the institution.
Identified as being the bulwark of the institution means to bear the
responsibilities the institution itself is expected to carry in the life of this
country. Thus, teachers are never really off the job of an institution that
is ubiquitous and essential to this county. Now, they are being told that
they have to be careful of what they say in all aspects of their jobs and to
be able to bifurcate that which is official-duty-speech from that which is
citizen-speech.
The constraints on teachers are immediately apparent; the impact on
the institution will become more evident with the passage of time and an

364. David Moss explains:
Although there is no typical day that is representative of the full range of what it is to
teach, ... these notions offer insight into the dedication, emotional toll, and knowledge
base required oftoday's teachers.
Perhaps most significant is the effort expended by each of these educators with
respect to the desire to meet the needs of each student in class. Whether it is scheduling
meetings to coordinate student support, revising lessons over the course of a single school
day in response to the learning styles of students, or developing curriculum materials to
capture student interest and sustain motivation, there is an underlying element of respect
and personal attention for students expressed by each teacher. Differentiating instruction,
attending to students' needs and interests, and providing support beyond the confines of
traditional classroom time are all measures designed to meet the needs of each and every
learner.

David M. Moss with Shirley Reilly, Christopher Burdman & Sayward Parsons, Walk a Mile in Their
Shoes: A Day in the Life of Professional Educators, in PORTRAIT OF A PROFESSION: TEACHING AND
TEACHERS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 85, 106 (David M. Moss et al. eds., 2005).
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increasing number of retaliation cases. In addition to the obvious
harms blow to morale, loss of public confidence, and potential spike in
litigation other tertiary concerns will begin to emerge. For instance,
school districts that retaliate for reporting child abuse and neglect will
become targets of lawsuits by parents for failing to prevent subsequent
365
abuse;
as often as possible, teachers will learn to entwine
controversial speech with federal legislation that affords a cause of
366
367
action for retaliation
or with applicable state whistleblower laws;
teachers will find alternative causes of action against school boards who
retaliate, asserting intentional torts such as intentional infliction of
368
369
emotional distress,
defamation, and stigma, which entail punitive
damages awards; and school administrators will find themselves
370
investigated on criminal charges of intimidation.
In any case, no
public employee should be put into the position of having to choose her
job over her duty as Garcetti requires. This is only a lose-lose situation
for both children ,and the institution itself.
Surely there are better ways for school boards to govern their labor
relationships. A return to Pickering, which better suits teachers and the
employment relationship, would still accomplish what school boards
intend a moderate grasp on their employees' behavior. Garcetti is a
bazooka in a knife fight and with the same incipient risks of blowing
up in one's face.
.

.

365. See, e.g., Marquay v. Eno, 662 A.2d 272 (N.H. 1995). Worse yet will be the criminal
investigations for failure to report.
366. Titles VI, VII, and IX and the Rehabilitation Act currently protect individuals from
retaliation for speech arising from their rights. See supra notes 200-206 and accompanying text.
367. See generally FISCHER, SCHIMMEL & STELLMAN, supra note 302, at 134.
368. See, e.g., Radvany v. Jones, 585 N. Y.S.2d 343 (App. Div. 1992) (holding that principal could
be sued for intentional infliction of emotional· distress for intimidating his assistant principal after he
retaliated against her for reporting a teacher had ·altered students' answers for the· Regents examination).
369. See, e.g., Worona & Randall, supra note 323, at 13-1, 13-8.
370. In line with efforts at prior restraint will be the temptation for school administrators and
school boards to use Garcetti as a weapon, to threaten teachers with retaliation for doing their jobs,
Criminal statutes concerning intimidation would forestall that sort of persistent behavior, especially
when
one
threatens
the
victim
with
hann if the victim does a lawful act. See, e.g., IND. CODE§ 35-45-2.
.
1 (2007) (a Class D felony if against an employee of a school corporation); MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 265;
§ 25 (2007). Other statutes specifically criminalize acts of intimidation against public employees who
are doing their jobs. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-10-2 (2007) (obstructing governmental operations);
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-6 (2007) (public official); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 509.080 (West 2007) (an
officia1); NEV. REv. STAT.§ 199.300 (2007) (public employee). It would be nice if one could say that
school administrators will not intimidate teachers, but they do. See, e.g., Rabon v. Bryan County Bd. of
Educ., 326 S.E.2d 577 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (upholding tennination of principal for, among other things,
intimidating teachers).

